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Free Exercise, Fair Housing and
Marital Status-Alaskan Style
This Note examines the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission that a landlord
may not refuse to rent to an unmarried couple even if the landlord
claims that doing so would impinge on a sincerely held religious
belief that cohabitation is a sin. First, this Note develops a frame-
work for analyzing whether laws preventing discrimination on the
basis of marital status protect unmarried couples. In developing
this framework, this Note examines four recent cases from other
jurisdictions and Alaska's jurisprudence on marital status
discrimination in housing. Then, this Note examines the circum-
stances under which a landlord may or may not enjoy an
exemption from marital status discrimination laws by advancing
his constitutional right to exercise his religion freely. The Note
compares case law from other jurisdictions to the Swanner
decision to highlight the Swanner court's novel approach to
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted. Finally,
this Note concludes by suggesting the consequences of the
Swanner decision for Alaska
I. INTRODUCTION
Can a landlord refuse to rent to an unmarried couple because
of a sincerely held religious belief that cohabitation is a sin?
To date, courts in four states, including Alaska, have examined
marital status anti-discrimination housing laws in the context of free
exercise of religion defense claims.' Only the Alaska Supreme
Copyright © 1995 by Alaska Law Review
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1. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App.), review granted and opinion
superseded by 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment and Hous.
Cornm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion
superseded by 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993);
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Court has definitively found the state to possess a governmental
interest in prohibiting discrimination that is sufficiently compelling
to override a landlord's free exercise claim. Only in Alaska, then,
has a court found that unmarried couples enjoy constitutional
protection from housing discrimination. Landlords may not refuse
to rent even when they sincerely believe cohabitation is morally
wrong.
To resolve the tension between housing discrimination laws
and a landlord's free exercise right, courts must perform a complex
two-stage analysis. First, they must determine the scope of laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status. Such laws
clearly protect married couples. The question for courts is whether
they also protect unmarried couples. This is a surprisingly difficult
task and one that involves much analytical subtlety. Second, if
unmarried couples are within the ambit of marital status protec-
tions, courts must determine whether the anti-discrimination laws
can be enforced against landlords raising a free exercise defense.
In light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 19932 and differing provisions in state
constitutions, courts' reasoning behind the ultimate resolution of
the issue is often murky.
This Note analyzes Alaska's maverick resolution of the
question of whether a landlord can refuse to rent to unmarried
couples. Part II presents a synopsis of the holdings and reasoning
of the recent Alaska case on this issue, Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission.3 Part III examines marital status
discrimination in housing generally, addressing the first step in the
two-stage analysis courts must perform. This part begins with a
theoretical examination of what must constitute notions of "marital
status." This theoretical framework is then examined against four
recent cases involving housing discrimination against unmarried
couples that have arisen in the context of free exercise defense
claims and against Alaska's jurisprudence on marital status
discrimination in housing.
Parts IV and V shift to an examination of the possibilities for
a free exercise defense, the second step in the two-stage analysis
courts must perform. Part IV considers the defense in terms of
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); State by Cooper v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
3. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
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federal constitutional and statutory law. Landlords have found
little solace here. Because protection for religious liberty was
apparently weakened by Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,4 -despite Congress's later attempt to
resuscitate it through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act-the
main action has really moved to the state constitutional arena.
Part V thus turns to that state constitutional analysis. This
part begins by sketching the framework that courts in other
jurisdictions have used when finding that the prevention of marital
status discrimination in housing is not a government interest of high
enough order to withstand a free exercise defense. This part next
considers the development of Alaska's free exercise jurisprudence,
in particular the bifurcated nature of its compelling interest test.
Finally, this part examines how, in Swanner, the Alaska Supreme
Court took the older compelling interest test into the post-Smith
world. In an interesting, and what will surely be a controversial
twist, the court created a new two-fold government interest test,
one prong being the state's derivative interest' and the other prong
being the state's transactional interest.6 This part analyzes in
depth the meaning and import of the new two-fold test.
Part VI concludes by restating the results of the two-stage
analysis for unmarried couples and the landlords who would
discriminate against them in Alaska. The implications for Alaskan
jurisprudence are noted, as is Alaska's own status as protector of
civil rights or conspirator in moral decay.
II. OVERVIEW OF SWANNER V. ANCHORAGE EQUAL RIGHTS
COMMISSION
On May 13, 1994, the Alaska Supreme Court handed down its
final decision in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission.!
The court held that a landlord cannot discriminate on the basis of
marital status and that, by enforcing state and municipal prohibi-
tions on such discrimination, a landlord's right to free exercise of
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the majority wrote that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes ...
conduct that his religion prescribes." Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
5. See infra text accompanying note 197.
6. See infra text accompanying note 198.
7. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
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religion under both the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions has not been
violated by the state. In reaching this decision, the court created
a new two-fold test under the Alaska Constitution to determine
whether a religious exemption should be granted from certain anti-
discrimination laws or whether there exists a competing state
interest of the highest order trumping the free exercise right.
Deciding for the latter in this instance, the new test involves
assessing the state's derivative and transactional interests "in
preventing individual acts of discrimination based on irrelevant
characteristics."' How this new two-fold test will affect future
claims for religious exemptions remains to be seen. For the time
being, the Swanner decision places Alaska, depending on one's
perspective, either at the forefront of protecting the rights of the
unmarried or at the bottom of the barrel in submerging free
exercise rights in a secular society.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Three separate individuals, Joseph Bowles, William F Harper
and Dee Moose, filed complaints with the Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission ("AERC"), charging that Tom Swanner, doing
business as Whitehall Properties, had discriminated against them on
the basis of marital status when they had attempted to rent real
property from him. The complaints alleged that Swanner had
violated state and municipal anti-discrimination laws" when he
had refused either to rent or to allow inspection of rental property
after learning that each complainant intended to share the rental
unit with a member of the opposite sex to whom he or she was not
married." It was undisputed that Swanner's refusal was entirely
the result of a policy formulated to accommodate his Christian
religious beliefs that cohabitation was fornication and that even a
Platonic living arrangement would be sinful because it would
suggest the appearance of immorality.2
The AERC consolidated the three cases, and, after hearings,
the examiner issued and served a recommended decision and
proposed order in favor of the complainants on January 7, 1991.
When the parties failed to object within ten days, the proposed
8. Id. at 282.
9. Id. at 276.
10. Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240 (1991); Anchorage Mun. Code § 5.20.020.
11. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 276-77.
12. Id. at 277-78.
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order became final on January 22, 1991.1 Swanner appealed to
the superior court, which affirmed the AERC's decision. He subse-
quently appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court on three grounds:
(1) the superior court erred in finding that he discriminated on the
basis of marital status; (2) even if he does discriminate on the basis
of marital status, he is due an exemption from the anti-discrimina-
tion laws because of his fundamental federal and state constitution-
al right to the free exercise of his religion; and (3) the automatic
finalization of the AERC's decision violated his due process
rights.'4
On February 11, 1994, the Alaska Supreme Court released its
initial 4-1 affirmance in the case, with majority opinion by Justice
Burke. 5 Swanner's petition for rehearing was granted in light of
President Clinton signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 ("RFRA") on November 16, 1993.16 In the meantime,
Justice Burke had retired. The initial decision was therefore
withdrawn, and the modified majority opinion, now 3-1, was issued
per curiam on May 13, 1994."7
B. Holdings
1. Swanner violated Alaska Statutes § 18.80.240 and Anchor-
age Municipal Code § 5.20.020 by discrimination based on marital
status. Swanner argued before the court that he does not discrimi-
nate on the basis of marital status since he is perfectly willing to
rent to people who are single, married, widowed, divorced or
separated. His religious beliefs only prevent him from renting to
13. Id. at 277. The AERC's procedural rules at the time provided that each
party had 10 days within which to submit written objections or the proposed
decision would automatically become final. See Anchorage Mun. Code
§ 5.10.015(A).
14. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 277. Because Swanner's due process elements have
no substantive connection with the issues of marital status discrimination and free
exercise of religion, they will not be considered further in this Note.
15. 868 P.2d 301, 1994 WL 41377 (Alaska 1994), withdrawn; see also James J.
Kilpatrick, Right to "Shack Up" v. Religious Freedom, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
June 9, 1994, at B7.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
17. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 276; Telephone Interview with Kevin Gilbert
Clarkson, Attorney for Petitioner (Sept. 21,1994). According to Mr. Clarkson the
only substantive modification was the addition of a footnote concerning RFRA,
leaving the now-per curiam opinion to be essentially that of retired Justice Burke.
See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 n.9.
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couples who wish to cohabit. The court, however, had recently
examined the plain meaning and intent of the anti-discrimination
laws in Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission."8 In
Foreman the court reasoned, and in Swanner it reaffirmed, that
where a landlord would have rented to a couple had they been
married, and refused to rent only after learning the couple was not
married, the landlord is unlawfully discriminating on the basis of
marital status.'9
The court rejected Swanner's argument that his form of
discrimination is not prohibited because it was based upon conduct
rather than marital status. Given the definition of "cohabit, ' '20 a
cohabiting couple's conduct and marital status are too inextricably
intertwined, especially when it is their unmarried status that makes
the conduct immoral in Swanner's opinion.2'
2. Swanner's Free Exercise right under the First Amendment
was not violated. By enforcing the anti-discrimination laws against
him, Swanner claims his coerced compliance compels a Hobson's
choice: his religious beliefs or his livelihood. Because of his
fundamental right to free exercise, Swanner asserted he was due an
exemption to accommodate his religious beliefs.22 The court
found, however, that while the First Amendment grants absolute
protection for freedom of belief, it provides only limited protection
for conduct dictated by religious belief.' Relying on the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,24 the court rejected the need to apply
18. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
19. Id. at 1203; Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278.
20. "Cohabit" is defined as "[t]o live together in a sexual relationship when not
legally married." Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278 n.4 (quoting THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 259 (1980)). But cf.
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 218 (1976) ("1: to live together as
husband and wife[;] 2a: to live together or in company. .. ."); cf. also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990) ("Cohabitation. To live together as husband
and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations
which are usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily
dependent on sexual relations." (citing Boyd v. Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400, 404 (Ct.
App. 1964))).
21. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278 n.4.
22. Id. at 279.
23. Id
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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the Sherbert' compelling state interest test and instead turned to
the Supreme Court's recent language in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye: "[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even
if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice."26 Finding the marital status anti-discrimination
laws both neutral and generally applicable and no other additional
constitutional right implicated, the court held that enforcement of
the anti-discrimination laws against Swanner did not violate his
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. 7
Noting that RFRA replaced the Smith test with the compelling
interest test, the court nevertheless asserted that the outcome was
unaffected, assuming that RFRA is both constitutional and
applicable, since the court found compelling state interests under
its analysis of the state constitutional claim to support the prohibi-
tions on marital status discrimination.28
3. Swanner's Free Exercise right under the Alaska Constitution
was not violated. Swanner had argued, before the enactment of
RFRA, that the Alaska Constitution could provide him greater
protection than Smith might afford him. The court agreed and held
that it would apply Frank v. State,29 which had adopted the
Sherbert test to determine whether certain exemptions are required
under the Free Exercise Clause of the Alaska Constitution. °
Finding that Swanner fulfilled the Frank requirements for a
religious exemption, the real issue before the court was whether
there was a competing state interest of the highest order trumping
the right to an exception.31 In a novel development, however, the
court bifurcated the nature of the governmental interest at stake
into "a 'derivative' interest in ensuring access to housing for
everyone, and a 'transactional' interest in preventing individual acts
of discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics."32 Whereas
25. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a discussion of the Sherbert
compelling interest test, see infra note 125.
26. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2226 (1993).
27. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 279-80.
28. Id. at 280 n.9.
29. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
30. ALAsKA CoNsT. art. 1, § 4.
31. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280-82.
32. Id. at 282.
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most free exercise cases, including Frank, involve derivative
interests,33 the court found the instant case distinguishable. After
reviewing the legislative intent, the court found that acts of
discrimination, "as independent social evils," will "degrade[]
individuals" and "affront[] human dignity" and thereby harm the
state's transactional interest in preventing such discrimination.34
The court held that Swanner was not due a religious exemp-
tion because his religiously impelled conduct, in a commercial arena
in which he voluntarily entered, impinged on the private right of
unmarried couples not to be unfairly discriminated against in
housing-a governmental interest of the highest order. Therefore,
enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws did not violate his free
exercise right under the Alaska Constitution. 5
C. Chief Justice Moore's Dissent
In his dissent,36 Chief Justice Moore took issue with the
court's creation of its new two-fold derivative and transactional
interests test under the Alaska Constitution. He found the new test
to be utterly malleable to "predetermine[] the outcome of the case"
and "little more than a strained effort to distinguish Frank."37
Indeed, Chief Justice Moore argued that even under its new
framework the state's interest in eradicating marital status discrimi-
nation in housing was not of a high enough order: it was not akin
to discrimination against certain historically disadvantaged groups;
the state itself discriminates on the basis of marital status in the
realms of intestate succession, workers' compensation death
benefits and the marital communication privilege; there has never
been any heightened scrutiny under federal or Alaska equal
protection analysis for marital status classifications; and federal laws
do not treat such discrimination as a compelling interest. 8
Chief Justice Moore argued that Swanner's religious beliefs
warranted an exemption for at least three reasons: (1) there was
no evidentiary basis for the majority's finding of invidiousness; (2)
the commercial context did not result in a waiver of a constitutional
33. Id.
34. Id. at 282-83.
35. Id. at 283-84.
36. Chief Justice Moore's original dissent apparently was not altered after the
petition for rehearing was granted.
37. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 287 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 287-89 (citations omitted) (Moore, CJ., dissenting).
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right to free exercise; and (3) there was no suggestion that
Swanner's conduct posed a substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order, the other prong in the Frank test.39 Indeed, he conclud-
ed his dissent with the ominous warning that "the analysis and
result set forth in this case will return to haunt this court in future
decisions. '
III. MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
A. What Is "Marital Status"?
The first issue in Swanner was whether the landlord had
violated the anti-discrimination laws by discriminating on the basis
of marital status. But what is marital status, or, alternatively, what
is it that the anti-discrimination laws seek to protect? Commenta-
tors have suggested that the concept of marital status is divisible
into two categories: (1) a "narrow view" in which discrimination
is found only when the individual has been treated differently,
solely on the basis of that individual's status as single, married,
separated, divorced or widowed, and (2) a "broad view" that looks
at the couple by considering the identity or relationship of partners
in determining whether discrimination has occurred.4' It has been
urged that the broad view should and does support the enforce-
ment of anti-discrimination laws to protect the rights of unmarried,
cohabiting couples.42
This conceptual division into individual/couple, however, is
unsatisfactory. Analytically, the concept of marital status is
dualistic: either one is married or not married. If one is married,
then one necessarily shares a relationship with another identifiable
individual who is also married. Both individuals possess identical
marital statuses, but so do many others. It can be said they share
the same marital status only to the extent that functionally the
39. Id. at 287-90 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 291 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
41. John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A
Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1419,
1424 (1991); Robert C. Mueller, Case Comment, Donahue v. Fair Employment
and Housing Commission. A Free Exercise Defense to Marital Status Discrimina-
tion?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 145, 149 (1994).
42. Beattie, supra note 41, at 1432; Mueller, supra note 41, at 156-57.
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relationship militates it.43 On this rigid dualistic view, then, a
prohibition on marital status discrimination in housing would mean
a landlord could not prefer an individual who is married to one
who is not, or vice versa. Thus two married individuals who come
to Alaska to work (and live) together, leaving their respective
spouses behind, must be similarly situated in the eyes of a landlord
as two single college roommates.
Much more problematic is the category of unmarrieds. Our
dualistic analysis would be simple and complete if society's
conception of "single" was isomorphic with "not married." But
relationships have a way of making their presence felt by infiltrat-
ing and wreaking havoc with neat little conceptual categories, as
perusals of the personal ads in many newspapers will attest.
"Single" no longer seems to mean "not married" but something
more specific, such as "never married." The other standard
classifications, separated, divorced and widowed, thus imply "not
currently married." More importantly, these three classifications
only have substantive content because of a relationship that
necessarily exists with another identifiable individual, the former
spouse. When courts determine the applicability of marital status
anti-discrimination laws according to the "broad view" by consider-
ing the identity or position of the partner, such consideration is
really a proxy for the examination of the underlying relationship.
The "broad view," then, is not broad enough, being underinclusive.
Cohabitation adds another layer to the analysis. Is it possible
to consider cohabitation a status-"not legally married but living
together as if married"? Not in a dualistic sense, obviously, for it
is the relationship, the "together," that is being instantiated.
Unlike the married individual who comes to Alaska to work,
leaving the spouse behind, but each retaining their married
status(es), a cohabitant cannot do the same. Once the cohabitant
leaves her partner behind, they are no longer cohabitants.
If cohabitation, then, is essentially a relationship, it is arguable
that there is no logical basis on which to distinguish it-or to justify
discrimination based upon it-from any of the other marital status
classifications, each of which in practice imbed notions of relation-
ship. Although the broad view may be theoretically underinclusive,
43. Of course, it is to this functional capacity that the law generally gives
effect. The legal privileges and duties of marriage, such as, for example, intestate
succession and the marital communication privilege, have everything to do with
to whom one is married and not to one's marital status per se.
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it is potentially expansive enough to capture cohabitation within its
ambit.
But if cohabitation is merely an overlaying relationship, and
there is no discrimination with respect to relationship implicit in the
standard marital status classifications, then an alternative view
becomes possible: the overlaying relationship's purpose is to
facilitate conduct. In particular, cohabitation facilitates, indeed,
becomes synonymous with, fornication. Because marital status
anti-discrimination laws are not designed to protect conduct, but
status, there is no protection for fornicators-or cohabitants, so the
reasoning would go. One major difficulty with this alternative view
is proof of conduct when the burden shifts to the defendant to
show a non-discriminatory justification. Mere speculation is hardly
probative, and stereotypical assumptions are precisely what anti-
discrimination laws seek to combat. Courts will find it easy to
identify sufficient public policy grounds on which to prohibit the
sorts of activities that will likely obtain the requisite proof of
conduct.
This extended analytical discussion has identified three main
concepts-status, relationship and conduct-that will prove useful
in analyzing legislative and judicial decisions relating to marital
status anti-discrimination laws. In particular, these concepts
provide a framework in which to test the boundaries of existing law
with regard not only to cohabiting heterosexual couples but also to
cohabiting same-sex couples.
B. The State of Fair Housing Law
1. Federal law. Because of the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution,' federal law is the place to begin in determin-
ing whether marital status is a protected classification. Although
Congress has never expressly protected unmarried couples from
housing discrimination, a few courts have interpreted federal law
to provide protection in two areas-credit transactions and public
45
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
45. Matthew J. Smith, Note, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in
Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1055, 1068 (1992).
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First, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has held that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act46 expressly
forbids discrimination on the basis of marital status in credit
transactions.47 Despite clear evidence that Congress intended the
"sex or marital status" provision to protect women in credit
transactions, the court nevertheless found the "plain meaning" of
the law to include unmarried couples as well.48
Second, courts have interpreted federal law to protect
unmarried couples from discrimination in public housing. A federal
district court has found that under the United States Housing Act
of 1937,49 a public housing authority cannot deny housing benefits
to an unmarried couple without first making an individual determi-
nation as to whether the applicants constitute a family unit.50 And
a California state court has concluded that the federal constitution-
al rights of due process, equal protection and privacy are violated
when a public housing authority evicts a tenant for cohabitation.5'
In particular, the California court found that a policy prohibiting
cohabitation irrebuttably "presumes immorality," which denies due
process and creates a classification that "improperly assumes a
connection with undesirable conduct," a violation of equal
46. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f (1982 & West Supp. 1995). The act provides in
pertinent part that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against
any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-(1) on the basis
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the
applicant has the capacity to contract) ... ." Id. § 1691(a).
47. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569-70 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Since federal law required lenders to aggregate the income of married
couples, it was unlawful discrimination for lenders to refuse to aggregate the
income of an unmarried couple who jointly applied for a mortgage. Id. at 569-70
& 569 n.4.
48. Id. at 569; see also Comment, Protection of Unmarried Couples Against
Discrimination in Lending Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act: Markham v.
Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 93 HARv. L. REv. 430, 434 (1979) (discussing
congressional intent in the passage of the Act). Markham appears to be the only
federal case that applies the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to unmarried couples.
Smith, supra note 45, at 1069 n.64. See generally Joan Kirshberg, Annotation,
Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on Basis of Marital Status Under Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (15 USCS §§ 1691 et seq.), 55 A.L.R. Fed. 458 (1981 &
Supp. 1994).
49. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 1437-1437u (1994 & West Supp. 1995).
50. Hann v. Housing Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
51. Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380-81 (Ct.
App. 1976).
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protection 2 In these cases, the courts invalidated narrow defini-
tions of "family" and essentially found that public housing
authorities cannot deny benefits to unmarried couples based solely
on marital status. 3
Federal statutory law provides unmarried couples no further
substantial protection from housing discrimination. While the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988, prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin and handicap,
marital status is not a protected classification 4 Indeed, Congress
explicitly intended to exclude marital status from being encom-
passed within familial status.' Nonetheless, the Fair Housing Act
can be invoked for protection by unmarried couples, but only if
they can prove that the discrimination based on their marital status
is really a subterfuge for more egregious discrimination based on
one of the protected classifications.5 6
Federal law thus provides a starting point for unmarried
couples for protection from marital status discrimination. Yet its
limitations are so circumscribed that nearly all litigants must turn
to state law.
2. State law. No state fair housing law expressly protects
unmarried couples from housing discrimination. When protection
has been given, it has been through judicial interpretation of
marital status provisions in state and municipal anti-discrimination
prohibitions.
Courts in nine of the twenty-two jurisdictions in which fair
housing laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status
52. Id. at 380.
53. Smith, supra note 45, at 1071 & n.71.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
55. I.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184. Familial status is defined as "one or more individuals
(who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with... a parent or
another person having legal custody of such individual or individuals." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602(k).
56. James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The
Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. RaV. 1049, 1106 (1989). The
same is also true of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988). See, e.g., Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506
(10th Cir. 1987) (holding that employer's no-spouse rule violated Title VII only
because its operation had a disparate impact on female employees).
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have determined whether the term "marital status" protects
unmarried couples.' The results appear to be nearly evenly split,
although some holdings are equivocal. Roughly speaking, courts in
Alaska,"8 California,59 Massachusetts' and New Jersey6 have
found "marital status" to include unmarried couples, whereas courts
in Illinois,62 Maryland,6' Minnesota,' New York and Wash-
57. For citations to the marital status provisions in the anti-discrimination laws
in the 22 jurisdictions that have enacted them, see Smith, supra note 45, at 1074
n.80. For citations to the fair housing laws of the 48 jurisdictions that have
enacted them, see id. at 1073 n.78. The three jurisdictions that have not enacted
fair housing laws are Arkansas, Mississippi and Wyoming.
58. Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989)
(landlord policy against renting to unmarried couples violated state and municipal
prohibitions against marital status discrimination); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460
(1994); see also infra part III.C-D.
59. Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct.
App.) (assuming that marital status in its broadest, most generic sense must
include unmarried couples), review granted and opinion superseded by 880 P.2d 111
(Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment and Hous. Conm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32
(Ct. App. 1991) (landlords' refusal to rent to unmarried couple violated statute
prohibiting marital status discrimination), review granted and opinion superseded
by 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Hess v.
Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1982) (same);
Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976) (policy
prohibiting occupancy of public housing by unmarried couple violated marital
status provision of housing anti-discrimination statute).
60. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (statute
prohibiting marital status discrimination in leasing applies to discrimination against
unmarried woman and unmarried man seeking jointly to rent apartment);
Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 547
N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1989) (denial of public housing benefits to unmarried couple
violated marital status provision of housing anti-discrimination statute).
61. Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corp., 8 NJ. Admin. 110 (1985) (refusal to
rent to two unmarried persons of the opposite sex violated statute prohibiting
marital status discrimination in housing).
62. Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (IM. App. Ct.) (refusal to
rent to unmarried persons of the opposite sex not prohibited by Illinois Human
Rights Act), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. 1990).
63. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475
A.2d 1192 (Md. 1984) (marital status discrimination prohibition did not preclude
housing cooperative from restricting occupancy to immediate family members);
Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1981) (county ordinance prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing
did not preclude housing cooperative from refusing unmarried couple's applica-
tion).
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ington66 have found it does not.67  Courts in three jurisdictions
have found marital status provisions to apply to same-sex room-
mates.
68
Some commentators suggest that those courts that have found
marital status to include unmarried couples have adopted the broad
64. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (refusal to rent to
unmarried woman who intended to cohabit with fiance did not violate Minnesota
Human Rights Act).
65. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983) (no marital
status discrimination where landlord enforced lease restriction limiting occupancy
to tenant's immediate family). But cf. Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 450
N.Y.S.2d 962 (1982) (marital status discrimination prohibition applied to lease
terms and conditions so tenant could not be evicted for previously cohabiting with
man not a member of lessee's immediate family); Munroe v. 344 East 76th Realty
Corp., 448 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1982) (marital status discrimination prohibition forbade
landlord from evicting tenant who was cohabiting).
66. McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (no
marital status discrimination where woman's application denied because of
intended cohabitation).
67. A number of these cases have been analyzed by commentators. See
Beattie, supra note 41, at 1422-23, 1425-27; Mueller, supra note 41, at 151-57;
Smith, supra note 45, at 1078-91. See generally Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, What
Constitutes Illegal Discrimination under State Statutory Prohibition Against
Discrimination in Housing Accommodations on Account of Marital Status, 33
A.L.R.4th 964 (1984 & Supp. 1994).
68. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 301 A.2d 754 (N.J. 1973)
(statute prohibiting real estate brokers from refusing rental based on marital status
applied where two unmarried females sought to rent two-bedroom apartment).
Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights 481 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (two women who sought to purchase co-op presented sufficient evidence that
denial of application violated statute prohibiting marital status discrimination).
But cf. Evangelista Assocs. v. Bland, 458 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1983) (no marital status
discrimination where lease term restricting occupancy to tenant's immediate family
applied to male tenant living with unrelated male); Hudson View Properties v.
Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983) (court's language indicated that lease term
restricting occupancy to lessee's immediate family would be enforceable to bar
roommate of same sex as lessee).
Loveland v. Leslie, 583 P.2d 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (marital status
discrimination prohibition forbade policy of only renting to married couples where
single man sought to share apartment with male roommate).
But cf., e.g., County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993) (holding
that county ordinance prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing did not
apply to landlord who refused to rent to unrelated single persons living together
since discrimination was based on "conduct" (living together) and not "marital
status").
See also Miller, supra note 67, § 3.
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view with its focus on the couple and, conversely, those that have
found marital status not to protect unmarried couples have utilized
the narrow view with its focus on the individual.69 At the core of
the narrow view approach is an "all-or-none" rule: "if the
challenged policy does not disadvantage all married people, none
may invoke the state prohibition against marital status discrimina-
tion to challenge it."7 While an all-or-none rule is superficially
dualistic, in practice it does not track precisely the dualistic
conception of marital status discussed above. Courts applying such
an all-or-none rule do not consider an unmarried couple as carrying
a marital status; rather these courts consider only whether each
unmarried individual qua individual is discriminated against as
compared to a married couple. As a result, unmarried couples will
be found to be unprotected because the challenged policies do not
affect all unmarried persons, only those who choose to live with a
nonspousal partner.7'
Courts using the broad view are said not only to "analyze the
challenged policy to determine whether the same decision would
have been made if the plaintiffs had a different marital status," but
actually to "effectuate" their analyses by comparing similarly
situated married and unmarried couples qua couples." The
marital status discrimination prohibition is violated whenever the
comparison reveals disparate treatment based on a marital status
classification. Interestingly, courts arriving at inclusive results have
been observed to do so by a facial examination of the "plain
meaning" of the statute, avoiding public policy and legislative
intent arguments.73
Four recent cases involving marital status discrimination
against unmarried couples have involved free exercise of religion
defense claims. Their posture is thus similar to Swanner's. These
four cases, arising in Minnesota, California and Massachusetts, will
be analyzed further to provide a framework for Alaska's jurispru-
dence on the matter.
In State by Cooper v. French,74 a landlord refused to rent to
a prospective tenant because her desire to live with her fiance was
69. Beattie, supra note 41, at 1419-1428; Mueller, supra note 41, at 149-54.
70. Beattie, supra note 41, at 1422.
71. Id. at 1423.
72. Id. at 1426-27.
73. Id. at 1428; Smith, supra note 45, at 1078.
74. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
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inconsistent with his religious beliefs. Although there was no
evidence of intended sexual activity, the landlord believed that
merely living together presented the "appearance of evil."'75 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, exemplifying the so-called narrow view
approach, held that the landlord's refusal did not violate the
Minnesota Human Rights Act's ("MHRA") prohibition on marital
status discrimination since the term "marital status" did not apply
to a cohabiting couple.76
The Minnesota court granted that the term "marital status"
may include cohabiting couples, but found the term ambiguous
since the MHRA provided no statutory definition at the time.77
Turning to the legislative and judicial history of the MHRA, the
court found continuing vitality in the state's fornication statute,7
75. Id. at 3-4.
76. Id. at 7-8.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. The court read together three cases, State by McClure v. Sports & Health
Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985); Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No.
196, 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 330 (1984); and Kraft, Inc.
v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979), as standing for the proposition that,
"absent express legislative guidance, the term 'marital status' will not be construed
in a manner inconsistent with this state's policy against fornication and in favor of
the institution of marriage." French, 460 N.W.2d at 6. The court rejected the
argument that the state's fornication statute was moribund. Id. (discussing State
v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1986) (dealing with an educator charged with
fornication in connection with consensual sex acts with 16-year-old students)). In
fact, the court relied heavily on the Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning, in reaching
a contrary result, that Alaska's fornication statute had been repealed, id. at 7
(discussing Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comnm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska
1989)), and on the following reasoning of an Illinois court:
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the [Illinois Human Rights] Act would have
us conclude that the legislature intended to protect from discrimination
those individuals who choose to cohabit with a person of the opposite sex
without entering into marriage. The fornication statute, as it existed
when plaintiffs attempted to rent the apartments, evidenced this State's
policy against such a practice. We believe plaintiffs' interpretation of the
Act is in conflict with the longstanding policy reflected by the fornication
statute. Statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter should
be construed harmoniously where possible....
Such a stance [by this court] expresses neither approval nor
disapproval of discreet cohabitation; couples who wish to live together
without being married can certainly still do so, but they must find a
landlord who does not object to the arrangement. The Act's failure to
protect such couples from "discrimination" merely evidences the
legislature's hesitancy to require landlords to acquiesce.
Id. (quoting Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1157-58 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990)).
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and, in a later legislative response, an intent in non-employment
cases to address only status and not relationship.79 In language
exhibiting the impassioned nature surrounding these issues, the
court concluded:
It is simply astonishing... that the argument is made that the
legislature intended to protect fornication and promote a lifestyle
which corrodes the institutions which have sustained our civiliza-
tion, namely, marriage and family life. If the legislature intended
to protect cohabiting couples and other types of domestic
partners, it would have said so.'°
The French court's twist on "plain meaning" is interesting: Marital
status plainly does not include unmarried couples, for otherwise the
statute would plainly say so.
Courts in California and Massachusetts have come to the
opposite conclusion. In Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission,"' the California Second District Court of Appeal
held that the landlords' refusal to rent to an unmarried couple
79. A 1988 amendment to the MHRA defined "marital status" as "whether a
person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse
and, in employment cases, includes protection against discrimination on the basis
of identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.01(24) (West 1991).
80. French, 460 N.W.2d at 8. In an equally impassioned dissent, Chief Justice
Popovich cautioned that cohabitation should not presume a sexual relationship,
since it is interchangeable with "living together," id. at 13 (citing, inter alia,
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 218 (1976)) (Popovich, C.J.,
dissenting); criticized the majority for misinterpreting and failing to recognize that
precedent clearly established that discrimination on the basis of whom one lives
with falls within the marital status discrimination prohibition, id. at 12 (citing, inter
alia, State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985)
(holding that employer discriminated on basis of marital status by refusing to hire
applicants who were living with persons of the opposite sex)) (Popovich, C.J.,
dissenting); chastised the court for relying on the reasoning of Mister v. A.R.K.
Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (MII. App. Ct. 1990), which was not controlling and
appeared to represent the minority view, id. at 13 (citations omitted) (Popovich,
C.J., dissenting); and concluded that the state's fornication statute had fallen into
disuse since the last reported conviction dated from 1927, id. at 19 (citing State v.
Cavett, 213 N.W. 920 (Minn. 1927)) (Popovich, CJ., dissenting).
81. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion superseded
by 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). It is
important to note that the court of appeal's decision has been depublished. Under
Cal. R. Ct., Rule 977(a) (1995), unpublished decisions effectively have no
precedential value in California. Nonetheless, the final judgment is still binding
on the parties, and the reasoning may be instructive both for practitioners and for
courts in other jurisdictions.
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violated the marital status provision of the California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). Noting that "marital status"
was susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court accepted
the broad, inclusive view on five different grounds.
First, the court noted that when the legislature revisited FEHA
in 1980 it made no substantive effort to reverse an earlier judicial
interpretation of "marital status" as including unmarried couples. 3
Second, when the legislature prohibited marital status discrimina-
tion against any person, it defined "person" as "one or more
individuals."' Third, because California lacked a statute criminal-
izing cohabitation or fornication, there was no public policy to
undermine a finding of legislative intent to adopt the broad view.'5
Fourth, because the legislature had excepted university housing for
married students from the prohibition on marital status discrimina-
tion, the court would infer no others where a statute contains an
express exception to a general rule. 6 Finally, the court rejected
a discriminatory justification based on conduct, here phrased as
"lifestyle," where "that lifestyle is premised upon and defined by
the absence of marriage and thus constitutes discrimination based
on marital status.""7
Recently another California court, facing the same marital
status discrimination and free exercise issues as the Donahue court,
82. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a)-(d) (West 1992). In Donahue, the landlords,
devout Roman Catholics, justified their refusal to rent to an unmarried couple on
their religious belief that fornication is a mortal sin and that aiding in the
commission of a sin is also a sin. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33 n.1.
83. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37 (discussing the lack of legislative response
to Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976)
(finding on federal constitutional grounds that policy forbidding public housing
tenants from cohabiting is marital status discrimination)).
84. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37 (construing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a)
(West 1992)); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12925(d) (West 1992) (defining
"person"). The court relied upon similar reasoning, interpreting "person" in the
plural, in Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1201-02
(Alaska 1989) and Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989).
85. See Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38 (noting the result is contra, inter alia,
State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990)); but cf. supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
86. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38; see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12995(b)
(West 1992) (exempting college and university housing for married students from
the prohibition against marital status discrimination in housing).
87. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
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accepted as settled that "marital status" in California includes
unmarried couples. In Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission,88 the Third District Court of Appeal, without
rehashing any of the grounds in Donahue, merely adopted the
holdings of previous appellate decisions. 9  The Smith court,
however, found that the state's strong interest in favoring marriage
continued to exert a powerful influence. As a result, the court
concluded:
Even assuming ... that "marital status" in its broadest, generic
sense includes unmarried couples, a hierarchy still emerges from
within the classification because the state's interest in prohibiting
discrimination in housing against, for example, a widower or an
unmarried woman with children is more compelling than is its
interest in prohibiting discrimination against unmarried
couples.90
Because the court merely accepted the settled nature of the
scope of "marital status," it did not need to provide rationales to
justify its putative adoption of the broad view. Consequently, the
court did not find itself in the awkward position of rebuking its own
reasoning as it sought to undermine the implicit aim of the broad
view, absolute equality and protection for married and unmarried
couples alike. In this court's view, not all couples qua couples are
similarly legally situated.9' Where "the extension to unmarried
couples of rights that inhere in the marriage relationship is not a
state interest of the highest order,"92 some forms of disparate
treatment will be permissible.93
In Massachusetts, the Siupreme Judicial Court has also made
it clear that the marital status provision in the state's fair housing
law includes unmarried couples. In Attorney General v. Desilets,94
the court found no merit to a discriminatory justification based on
88. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded by
880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
89. Id. at 404 (citing Hess v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1982); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr.
375 (Ct. App. 1976)). Since Donahue was depublished, its conclusions were
unavailable; see supra note 81.
90. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 404-05 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 405 n.10.
93. As an example, the court pointed to the statutory exemption permitted for
housing at postsecondary institutions. Id. at 405-06; but cf. supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
94. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
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conduct since the prohibition against marital status discrimination
applied to an unmarried woman and an unmarried man seeking a
rental for joint occupancy." The "conduct" argument was merely
a pretext since "it is marital status and not sexual intercourse that
lies at the heart of the defendants' objection., 96 The controlling
difference could only be marital'status where a landlord would rent
to a cohabiting married couple but not to a cohabiting unmarried
couple.9 7
These four cases demonstrate the interrelationships between
the concepts of status, relationship and conduct in judicial interpre-
tations of the scope of marital status anti-discrimination laws. In
French, the Minnesota court explicitly sought to base its determina-
tion on status and not relationship. That court's reliance on the
legislative policy underlying the state's fornication statute colored
the status argument with a bolstering conduct argument. In
contrast, both the California court in Donahue and the Massachu-
setts court in Desilets rejected conduct arguments: The Donahue
court turned more to a relationship distinction, especially given the
absolute lack of an undermining policy against the conduct element
of fornication; the Desilets court appeared to reject the conduct
95. Id. at 235. In Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1989), the court had already held that public
housing benefits could not be denied to couples solely because they were not
married. Relying on the "reasonably straightforward language of the statute
itself," which expressly prohibited discrimination against "'any person or group of
persons,"' and noting that "marital status" is commonly used with respect to both
individuals and couples, the court concluded that the statute "reaches, and
prevents, discrimination in housing against, among others, unmarried couples." Id.
at 45 (quoting MAss. GEN. L. ch. 151B, §§ 4(6)-(7) (1989)).
96. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235.
97. Massachusetts has not repealed its fornication statute, MASS. GEN. L. ch.
272, § 18 (1992), but the court, in dictum, expressed its belief that the "statute is
of doubtful constitutionality, at least as applied to the private, consensual conduct
of persons over the age of consent." Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 240 (citation omitted).
It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts court presumed that cohabiting
couples, whether married or unmarried, would engage in sexual relations and
found it of no account. Id. at 235, 238, 240. More disturbing, however, is that the
Minnesota court in French also made the same presumption-even though the
record expressly presented no such evidence-and linked that presumption with
the state's policy interest as expressed in its fornication statute to deny unmarried
couples protection under the marital status umbrella. See State by Cooper v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4, 8 (Minn. 1990); id. at 12-13 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
Surely even a decision based on a compelling policy interest requires an adequate
evidentiary basis.
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argument more squarely on status alone. This difference is
attributable, at least in part, to a blurring of the line separating
status and relationship in statutory language requiring a plural
construction. The California court in Smith, however, gave the lie
to the implicit assumption of expansive protection in the relation-
ship-focused broad view, exposing as false any security that all
relationships are created equal. Thus a distinction between the
individual, equated with status, and the couple, implying relation-
ship, appears to matter less than whether a court finds continuing
vitality in a public policy expressed by the state's fornication
statute, essentially a conduct element, and whether the facial
language of the statute includes "persons" or "groups of persons,"
a plain meaning approach that forces a reconception of the dualistic
notion of marital status.
C. Alaska Jurisprudence
1. Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission. Whether
Alaska's marital status anti-discrimination prohibitions encom-
passed unmarried couples arose as a matter of first impression in
1989 when a couple refused to rent an apartment to an unmarried
woman, her infant child and the child's father. In Foreman v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission," the Alaska Supreme Court
reviewed the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission's decision that
the landlords had violated both state and municipal anti-
discrimination provisions.99 From the outset, Justice Burke,
98. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
99. Id. at 1201. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1991) provides in pertinent part:
Unlawful practices in the sale or rental of real property.
It is unlawful for the owner, lessee [sic], manager, or other person having
the right to sell, lease, or rent real property
(1) to refuse to sell, lease, or rent the real property to a person because
of sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, race, religion,
physical or mental disability, color, or national origin; however, nothing
in this paragraph prohibits the sale, lease, or rental of classes of real
property commonly known as housing for "singles" or "married couples"
only;
(2) to discriminate against a person because of sex, marital status,
changes in marital status, pregnancy, race, religion, physical or mental
disability, color, or national origin in a term, condition, or privilege
relating to the use, sale, lease, or rental of real property; however,
nothing in this paragraph prohibits the sale, lease, or rental of classes of
real property commonly known as housing for "singles" or "married
couples" only;
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writing for a unanimous court, stated the court would both adopt
a plain meaning approach, giving words "their ordinary and
common meaning,"'00 and attempt to effect the legislature's intent.10'
(3) to make a written or oral inquiry or record of the sex, marital status,
changes in marital status, pregnancy, race, religion, physical or mental
disability, color, or national origin of a person seeking to buy, lease, or
rent real property;
(4) to offer, solicit, accept, use, or retain a listing of real property with
the understanding that a person may be discriminated against in a real
estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or sources in connec-
tion therewith because of a person's sex, marital status, changes in
marital status, pregnancy, race, religion, physical or mental disability,
color, national origin, or age;
(5) to represent to a person that real property is not available for
inspection, sale, rental, or lease when in fact it is so available, or to
refuse to allow a person to inspect real property because of the race,
religion, physical or mental disability, color, national origin, age, sex,
marital status, change in marital status or pregnancy of that person or
any person associated with that person ....
Anchorage Mun. Code § 05.20.020 provides in pertinent part:
Unlawful practices in the sale or rental of real property.
Except in the individual home wherein the renter or lessee would share
common living areas with the owner, lessor, manager, agent or other
person, it is unlawful for the owner, lessor, manager, agent or other
person having the right to sell, lease, rent or advertise real property:
A. To refuse to sell, lease or rent the real property to a person because
of race, religion, age, sex, color, national origin, marital status or physical
handicap;
B. To discriminate against a person because of race, religion, age, sex,
color, national origin, marital status or physical handicap in a term,
condition or privilege relating to the use, sale, lease or rental of real
property;
C. To make a written or oral inquiry or record of the race, religion, age,
sex, color, national origin, marital status or physical handicap of a person
seeking to buy, lease or rent real property;
D. To offer, solicit, accept, use or retain a listing of real property with
the understanding that a person may be discriminated against in a real
estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or sources in connec-
tion therewith because of a person's race, religion, age, sex, color,
national origin, marital status or physical handicap;
E. To represent to a person that real property is not available for
inspection, sale, rental, or lease when in fact it is available, or to refuse
a person the right to inspect real property, because of the race, religion,
age, sex, color, national origin, marital status or physical handicap of that
person or because of any person associated with that person ....
100. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201 (citing Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage,
669 P.2d 569, 571-72 (Alaska 1983)).
101. Id. (citing State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208-09 n.4 (Alaska 1982)). Unlike
many states, the Alaska legislature was careful to provide a statutory basis for its
legislative findings and intent. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (1991) provides in
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Although both the state statute and municipal regulation
plainly prohibited marital status discrimination, the landlords
provided three principal reasons why those prohibitions were
inapplicable in their case: (1) the provisions protected only
individuals, not couples"°'; (2) the prohibitions were not intended
to apply to unmarried couples because cohabitation was a crime at
the time the provisions concerning marital status were adopted"°3;
and (3) the state statute excepts rental housing that is set aside for
"singles" or "married couples" only."°4
The court easily disposed of the first and third arguments.
Both the state statute and municipal code define "person" to mean
"one or more individuals."'"5  The court concluded that the
"provisions were intended to prevent discrimination against more
than one person" and, indeed, that the prohibitions protected
pertinent part:
(a) It is determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that
discrimination against an inhabitant of the state because of race, religion,
color, national origin, age, sex, marital status, changes in marital status,
pregnancy or parenthood is a matter of public concern and that this
discrimination not only threatens the rights and privileges of the
inhabitants of the state but also menaces the institutions of the state and
threatens peace, order, health, safety, and general welfare of the state
and its inhabitants.
(b) Therefore, it is the policy of the state ... to eliminate and prevent
discrimination in... the sale, lease, or rental of real property because of
the race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, physical or mental
disability, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or
parenthood.
The Anchorage Municipal Code contains a similar statement of purpose.
Anchorage Mun. Code § 05.10.010 provides in pertinent part:
The public policy of Anchorage is declared to be equal opportunity for
all persons. The Assembly finds that invidious discrimination in
employment, housing, public accommodations, education and financing
practices based upon race, color, sex, religion, national origin, marital
status, age, or physical handicap adversely affects the welfare of the
community. Accordingly, such discrimination is prohibited.
102. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201.
103. Id. at 1202.
104. Id. at 1203.
105. Id. at 1201-02 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(11); Anchorage Mun.
Code § 05.20.010(M)). Other definitions in the Anchorage Municipal Code
provide even further support; see id. § 05.20.010(D) ("'[d]iscrimination' means any
direct or indirect act or practice of exclusion. . . of a person or persons because
of ... marital status.. . ."); id. § 05.20.010(K) ("'[m]arital status' means any
differential treatment because of a person's marital status or change in marital
status. This includes differential treatment shown toward a person because he/she
is not married .... ).
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unmarried couples."°6 The landlords did not fall within the
statutory exception because they rented to all classes of persons,
not purporting to rent only to single persons or only to married
persons.'1°
Although it was true that cohabitation remained a crime in
Alaska until 1978,08 beyond the time of the adoption of the
marital status provisions,"° the court noted that in 1975, before
the pertinent amendments to the state statute and municipal code,
the state legislature had declared that "the criminal code of the
State of Alaska represents a considerable and vital body of law
which has not undergone substantive revision and is consequently
vastly out of step with constitutional and social developments of
recent decades."" When the criminal code was revised in 1978,
the cohabitation statute was not re-enacted. Given the legislative
intent that was plainly reflected in the statutory prohibitions, the
court held that "it would be manifestly unreasonable to limit the
effect of these modem, remedial provisions by reference to an
outdated criminal statute which was repealed eleven years
ago.'
106. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1202. The court therefore rejected the narrow view
exemplified by such cases as Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.,
431 A.2d 745,747-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding that an unmarried couple
has no collective marital status).
107. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1203 (construing ALAsKA STAT. § 18.80.240(2)); see
also supra note 99. This interpretation is similar to that adopted by the Donahue
court that when a statute contains an exception to a general rule, there for
university housing for married students, no other exceptions should be implied; see
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
108. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.040 (1970) (repealed 1978) ("A person who
cohabits with another in a state of adultery or fornication is punishable by a fine
of not more than $500, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than
one year nor more than two years, or by both.").
109. The state statute prohibiting marital status discrimination was enacted in
1975, the largely parallel municipal ordinance in 1976. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1202.
110. Id. (quoting S. Con. Res. 5, 9th Leg., 1st Sess., reprinted in Criminal Code
Revision, Alaska Criminal Code Revision Preliminary Report 2 (1976)).
111. Id. The court thus rejected the reasoning of the Washington court in
McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
(finding that former statute criminalizing cohabitation vitiates argument that
legislature intended to include unmarried couples in marital status discrimination
provision).
With regard to the remedial nature of anti-discrimination laws, compare the
analogous rationale of a New Jersey administrative law judge, who had also found
that "marital status" included unmarried couples:
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Although the Foreman court's clear holding is that unmarried
couples are protected from discrimination on the basis of marital
status,"2 the court's decision is ultimately based on status, that is
on the rights of individuals, and not on relationship. Even the
court's analysis of the former cohabitation statute, which would at
least appear to provide a relationship gloss, is really directed at
showing the irrelevance of conduct in the determination. Thus,
Foreman does not rest on an individual/couple distinction. Instead,
the decision fleshes out the skeletal analytical framework in this
way: First, by finding no current public policy expression against
the conduct-element fornication, and finding the traditional policy
against cohabitation entirely moribund when the marital status
protections were adopted, Foreman leaves no room for a discrimi-
natory justification based on conduct. Second, by considering the
plain meaning of words ("person") that must be given a plural
construction ("one or more individuals"), the fact of relationship
within the units that form the plural becomes of no account. The
true meaning and intent of status in a marital status anti-discrimina-
tion prohibition is crystallized: Whatever status one possesses
cannot be a basis upon which any decision or action may rest.
When these two prongs converge (that is, when the lack of a
public policy expression against the conduct-element is combined
with the obviation of relationship through a plural construction), as
they do in Foreman, and also in Donahue,l" unmarried couples
will necessarily be protected under marital status provisions. This
is not because unmarried couples share a joint marital status or
share any of the rights married couples may enjoy. Rather, it is
because unmarried couples are composed of unmarried individuals,
and the state has determined that an individual's unmarried status
cannot be a basis for discrimination, regardless of any relationship
or conduct elements that may inhere in it.
It seems to me that the attempt to connect up the "marital status" phrase
in the Law Against Discrimination to the [fornication and cohabitation]
statutes is of no avail .... [T]he statute is remedial in nature and
therefore is to be liberally construed in order to insure that its salutary
purposes are to be faithfully carried out.
Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corp., 8 NJ. Admin. 110, 115-16 (1985).
112. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1203.
113. The Donahue court had found Foreman's plural construction argument
convincing, and, although it did not cite Foreman for the fornication/cohabitation
policy review idea, it followed an analogous analysis, coming to the same
conclusion. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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When the prongs diverge, however, as they do in French, it is
truly the couple that is unprotected, since the marital status
provisions certainly protect individuals. Here a relationship,
unsanctioned by the state, may merely be a cover for conduct that
transgresses certain societal norms as expressed by legislative
policy. It is thus unsurprising that discrimination on this basis is
permitted.
Although not noted by the court in Foreman, at least two
additional aspects of Alaska Statutes section 18.80.240 provide
further support for this theoretical underpinning. First, this section
prohibits discrimination not only on the basis of marital status, but
also on the basis of changes in marital status." Second, subsec-
tion (3) makes it unlawful even to inquire or record the marital
status or change in marital status of a person involved in a real
property transaction." Together these two aspects should inhibit
the development of any evidentiary basis of conduct or relationship
elements that may foster prejudicial, discriminatory practices.
In sum, the Alaska legislature and the Anchorage Municipal
Assembly, backed by the authority of the Alaska Supreme Court,
have determined that marital status discrimination in housing is an
evil that ought to be prohibited. This protection extends to anyone
seeking housing, whether married or unmarried, whether a couple
or an individual. From this perspective at least, then, the compre-
hensive nature of Alaska's protections means that Alaska provides
at least as much protection as, and, in most cases, much more
protection than, that provided by other states in the realm of
marital status discrimination in housing.
2. Application in Swanner and Its Effect. Five years after
Foreman, the Alaska Supreme Court, in Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission, was again presented with the question
of whether the marital status anti-discrimination laws protected
unmarried couples. Even though Swanner arose in the context of
a claimed free exercise defense, that posture made no difference to
the determination that unmarried couples were protected by the
114. See supra note 99 for the text of the statute. The Anchorage Municipal
Code provides similar, parallel protection; see Anchorage Mun. Code
§ 05.20.010(K), supra note 105.
115. See supra note 99 for the text of the statute. The Anchorage Municipal
Code has a similar, parallel provision; see Anchorage Mun. Code § 05.20.020(C),
supra note 99.
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marital status umbrella. Instead of the landlords' claim in Foreman
that cohabitation had been a crime, Swanner asserted it was a
sin." 6 Yet because Swanner, like the landlords in Foreman,
would have rented to the couples had they been married, Swanner
had discriminated on the basis of marital status."7
Interestingly, while the court found no merit in Swanner's
conduct argument, it instead blurred the line between status and
conduct. The Foreman reasoning made it clear that the determina-
tion could flow directly from a pure status argument. By turning
to a consideration of the meaning of cohabitation, the Swanner
court found an inextricable link between conduct and status.'
The result for Alaska jurisprudence may be interesting. While it
is possible to see this as merely fuzzy reasoning, it is also possible
to see this as an expansion of the protections of Foreman, in the
sense of making more impermeable the marital status protection
umbrella.
The most notable class of persons likely to benefit from the
Foreman/Swanner analyses are not unmarried heterosexual couples,
who are clearly protected, but rather those individuals who
compose same-sex couples. Implicit in the language of the anti-
discrimination statute and in the Foreman decision is the notion
that unmarried individuals who wish to be roommates and just
happen to be members of the same sex cannot be discriminated
against."9 To find otherwise would appear to violate both the
sex and marital status provisions.
More controversial, however, is the interpretation that,
although Alaska Statutes section 18.80.240 does not explicitly list
sexual orientation as a protected classification, the language of the
statute and the decision in Foreman may suggest it as a natural
extension. Since no inquiry may be made of the sex or marital
status of the individual(s) seeking housing,"2 there would appear
to be no legal way in which knowledge of sexual orientation would
come to light unless volunteered. While Swanner does not state
that all discrimination on the basis of conduct is impermissible, it
does suggest that when conduct is inextricably combined with a
116. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comr'n, 874 P.2d 274,277 (Alaska)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
117. Id. at 278.
118. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
120. ALASicA STAT. § 18.80.240(3) (1991).
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protected classification, discrimination on that basis will be
impermissible. The question then becomes whether the conduct of
cohabiting same-sex couples is inextricably linked with their sex
status or marital status. Clearly, the conduct is partially linked with
both. It is the fact that both individuals are the same sex that
makes the conduct objectionable to some. The link with marital
status seems more tenuous, but that is precisely because the state
provides no legal sanction for the relationship."
Whether Alaska will extend to same-sex couples the protec-
tions it has granted unmarried heterosexual couples from housing
discrimination remains to be seen."2 But how secure are the
protections established in Foreman and reaffirmed in Swanner even
for unmarried heterosexual couples? To what extent are such civil
rights subject to or limited by the constitutional rights of others?
Swanner asked such questions, and he received some very compli-
cated answers.
IV. A FREE EXERCISE DEFENSE UNDER THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL STATUTES
A. Weaker Protection under Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith
After the Swanner court had determined that the landlord had
unlawfully discriminated against the unmarried couples on the basis
of marital status, it turned to consider the landlord's claim that he
121. See generally SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (R. Achtenberg ed.,
1990).
At least one court has stated that same-sex couples are not similarly situated
with respect to married couples, but instead all homosexuals are "simply a part of
the larger class of unmarried persons." Hinman v. Department of Personnel
Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416 (Ct. App. 1985). This view would appear to
bolster the argument that on the Foreman interpretation of marital status, same-
sex couples could not be discriminated against on the basis of their status
(unmarried) alone.
For a discussion of marital status discrimination and same-sex couples, see
Beattie, supra note 41, at 1449-53.
122. In fact, one state trial court has already made a leap beyond that. In
Tumeo v. University of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43 (Alaska Super. Ct., 4th Judicial
Dist. filed Jan. 11, 1995), Judge Mary Greene extended the protections from
marital status discrimination in housing under Foreman and Swanner to the
employee benefits context to prohibit the University of Alaska from using marital
status as a classification to prevent same-sex couples from qualifying for university-
subsidized health care coverage.
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was due an exemption to the anti-discrimination prohibitions to
accommodate his religious beliefs. The court was thus obliged to
turn to the second step in the two-stage analysis.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ."123 The
Free Exercise Clause applies to the states through its incorporation
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Recently, First Amendment jurisprudence with regard to the Free
Exercise Clause has undergone dramatic changes.
Modem free exercise jurisprudence had evolved a strict
scrutiny analysis,"z and it was this analysis that Swanner argued
should apply in his case." Yet, as the Alaska Supreme Court
noted, the U.S. Supreme Court had moved away from that
traditional compelling state interest test in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith." In Smith, a frac-
tured Court held that Oregon could constitutionally deny unem-
ployment benefits to members of the Native American Church who
were fired for ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony in violation
of a criminal narcotics statute."' The majority concluded that the
compelling interest test does not apply in free exercise challenges
to neutral laws of general applicability that merely have the
123. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
124. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
125. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), is said to be the "first and leading
case in the Supreme Court's modem free exercise jurisprudence." Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1990). In Sherbert the Court applied a strict
scrutiny analysis to South Carolina's denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh
Day Adventist who was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays: a government
regulation that substantially burdens a sincere religious practice is a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause unless the government can demonstrate a compelling
state interest and there is no less restrictive means of achieving that interest. See
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. As recently as 1989, the validity of the compelling
interest test seemed assured. See, e.g., Hemandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
699 (1989) ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a
substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and,
if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that burden.").
126. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,279 (Alaska)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
127. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
128. Id. at 890.
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incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. 29
Smith, then, apparently provides substantially less protection for
religious practices, for as long as the threshold requirements of
neutrality and general applicability are satisfied, the government
need only demonstrate a rational basis for its burden.'
The Swanner court applied a three-step Smith analysis. First,
it determined that the marital status anti-discrimination prohibitions
were neutral since they neither discriminated against a religious
practice on their face nor were "crafted to impede particular
religious conduct."'' Second, the court found that the statute
and ordinance were generally applicable since they apply to
everyone selling or renting real property and not just to a particular
religious group.' Finally, the court reasoned that, if these two
threshold requirements are satisfied, Smith still provided for an
exemption for a "hybrid situation" where an additional constitu-
tionally protected right is implicated, such as free speech. 3
However, Swanner had not contended that any right but his free
exercise right had been infringed.TM As a result of this Smith
analysis, the court perfunctorily concluded that Swanner's free
exercise right had not been violated under the First Amendment,
at least under Supreme Court jurisprudence.
129. Id. at 885.
130. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to revisit Smith in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). In Lukumi
Babalu Aye, the Court struck down city ordinances that prohibited animal sacrifice
but were effectively only aimed at the practices of the Santeria religion. The
Smith analysis was found not to apply since the ordinances were not neutral and
of general applicability.
It is important to note in at least one practical sense that Smith only
apparently provides less protection for religious liberty. Even under the
compelling interest test regime, the Court had been unsympathetic to those
seeking religious exemptions. Indeed, as at least one commentator has noted,
"since the Court first applied the compelling interest test in 1963, Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), is the only case where the Court has granted a
religious exemption outside the context of unemployment compensation." Stuart
G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State
Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 747, 751 n.29 (1993) (emphasis added).
131. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 279-80.
132. Id. at 280.
133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
134. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280.
135. Id. Amazingly, the court did not even attempt to state a rational basis for
the state's interest in the anti-discrimination laws, although it did quote ALASKA
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Of the four other marital status discrimination cases involving
a free exercise defense, only one used a Smith analysis; the other
three decided the issue on state constitutional grounds.136 In
Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,137 a Califor-
nia court of appeal observed that the marital status anti-discrimina-
tion statute satisfied the threshold requirements of neutrality and
general applicability.3 ' However, the Housing Commission had
required the landlord to post notices in her rental property stating
that she had been adjudicated for violation of the state fair housing
law as well as notices advising rental applicants of their rights and
remedies with regard to discrimination against unmarried cou-
ples."9 The court found this created a hybrid situation since the
coerced posting implicated Smith's First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.' As a result, the state needed to satisfy the
STAT. § 18.80.200's statement of purpose. See id. at 280 n.8; see supra note 101 for
the pertinent text of ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200.
136. See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990) ("In light of
the unforeseeable changes in established first amendment law set forth in recent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, justice demands that we analyze the present
case in light of the protections found in the Minnesota Constitution."); Donahue
v. Fair Employment and Hous. Conm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 40 (Ct. App. 1991)
("The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the application of Smith.
Unless the California Supreme Court adopts the approach in Smith, even if we
found the approach in Smith preferable, we are bound to continue to follow the
balancing test and compelling state interest analysis as a matter of state
constitutional law."), review granted and opinion superseded by 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney General v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994) ("Despite the similarity of the two constitutional
provisions, this court should reach its own conclusions on the scope of the
protections of [MASS. CONST.] art. 46, § 1, and should not necessarily follow the
reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the First
Amendment.").
The dissent in Donahue would have applied a Smith analysis. Finding the
case presented no hybrid situation and that the marital status anti-discrimination
provision was a "neutral, generally applicable statute which proscribes certain
conduct, is not religiously motivated, and has only an incidental effect on the
Donahues' free exercise," Associate Justice Grignon concluded that the Donahues
were not entitled to a religious exemption. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48
(Grignon, J., dissenting).
137. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded by
880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
138. Id. at 401.
139. Id. at 397-98.
140. Id. at 401-03. One justice disagreed with this assessment of the creation
of a hybrid situation. Associate Justice Raye argued that the free speech claim is
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compelling state interest test, which the court found it could not
do.
141
Thus, Alaska is the only state to have found that applying the
Smith analysis to marital status anti-discrimination laws permits the
state to enforce such laws without requiring an exemption for the
free exercise of religion. Given recent developments, Alaska may
remain the only state to do so.
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Congress has responded to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 ("RFRA"). 142 RFRA is clearly intended to reverse the
weakening effect of Smith by requiring the compelling state interest
test to be applied where the free exercise of religion has been
substantially burdened by a generally applicable law neutral toward
religion.43 Even though Swanner arose before the passage of
only linked to the free exercise claim by virtue of the remedy imposed by the
Commission and not by the statute itself. Moreover, assuming the remedial
posting requirement to be a violation of the landlord's free speech rights, it was
"clearly severable from the purported free exercise claim; we could simply strike
that portion of the order." Id. at 412-13 (Raye, J., concurring).
In Swanner, apparently the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission had also
ordered Swanner to post notices declaring that his policy regarding cohabitation
was illegal. See Brief for Petitioner, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 7 n.11,
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W.
3093 (Jul. 25, 1994) (No. 94-169). Swanner, however, had not argued that his free
speech rights were implicated, and so the Alaska court did not find a hybrid
situation. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
141. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404-07.
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb provides in part:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that-
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion;
Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened; and
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RFRA, RFRA is intended to be retroactive.'"
The Alaska Supreme Court's response to Swanner's defense
under RFRA was largely dismissive."4 Because the court had
essentially made its decision before RFRA was brought to its
attention, it cursorily treated the matter in a footnote: "Assuming
that [RFRA] is constitutional and applies to this case, it does not
affect the outcome, because we hold [under the Alaska Constitu-
tion] that compelling state interests support the prohibitions on
marital status discrimination."'" The least restrictive means
requirement was as handily dismissed: "The most effective tool the
state has for combatting discrimination is to prohibit discrimination;
these laws do exactly that. Consequently, the means are narrowly
tailored and there is no less restrictive alternative."1 47
Both the California court in its own Smith case and the
Massachusetts court in Desilets were nearly as perfunctory. Since
both applied a compelling interest analysis under their respective
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 provides in part:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
144. Id. § 2000bb-3(a); see also Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538,1542 (S.D.
Fla. 1994) (RFRA applies retroactively).
145. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
146. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 n.9. But compare Justice Thomas's solo dissent
to the denial of certiorari: "The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court drains the
word compelling of any meaning and seriously undermines the protection for
exercise of religion that Congress so emphatically mandated in RFRA." Swanner
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460, 462 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In fact, a number of federal courts have already begun to question the
constitutionality of RFRA. See, e.g., Celestial Church of Christ, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 1994 W.L. 282304, *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1994) ("Congress's codification
of certain Supreme Court opinions is not dispositive of the constitutional
parameters of the free exercise of religion."); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183,
186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the constitutionality of RFRA "raises a
number of questions involving the extent of Congress's powers under Section 5 of
the 14th Amendment").
147. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 n.9.
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state constitutions, additional analysis under RFRA was assumed
to be unnecessary."s  Since the time of the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith, the action had really moved on to the state
constitutional arenas.
V. A FREE EXERCISE DEFENSE UNDER THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTION
A. Protection under State Constitutions
1. Greater protection than Smith. It is often said that the
federal constitution provides a floor of protection for rights, while
state constitutions provide ceilings.'4 9 State constitutions there-
fore may, but are not required to, supplement individual rights by
providing greater protection for their citizens than the federal
constitution requires.' As a result of the Smith Court greatly
narrowing First Amendment protection, litigants are now turning
to state constitutional provisions for protection for religious
liberty.' Prior to Smith, most state courts had treated the
federal and state free exercise provisions as substantively identi-
cal." Post-Smith, some state courts have reacted by retaining the
148. See Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395,
410 (Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded by 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994);
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,236 n.5 (Mass. 1994). The Desilets
court noted that the defendants could assert RFRA rights on remand. Id.
Since RFRA expressly turned the clock back on Smith all the way to Sherbert
(1963) and Yoder (1972), query whether a RFRA analysis is really identical to the
compelling interest test as it stood just before the Smith decision in 1990.
149. Neil C. McCabe, The State and Federal Religion Clauses: Differences of
Degree and Kind, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 49, 50 & n.8 (1992).
150. Parsell, supra note 130, at 754; see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (stating that a state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution").
151. Indeed, one commentator has declared, "After Smith, it is malpractice for
an attorney to file a claim under the Religion Clauses of the federal Constitution
without also pleading the state constitution." Douglas Laycock, Summary and
Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 841, 854
(1992).
152. See Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Note, Religious Free Exercise
under State Constitutions, 34 J. CHURCH & ST. 303,307,320-21 (1992) (finding that
prior to Smith at least 40 states had never independently addressed their own state
free exercise provisions).
1995]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
compelling interest test under their respective state constitu-
tions.153
All of the courts that have addressed the issue of religious
exemptions to marital status anti-discrimination housing laws have
retained the compelling interest test through their state constitu-
tions. Of the five courts that have faced the issue in this posture,
only the Alaska Supreme Court in Swanner has found the state
able to satisfy the compelling interest test, thereby denying a
religious exemption.1"
In turning to a compelling interest test under state constitu-
tions, courts weighing the balance between the state's interest in
preventing marital status discrimination in housing and a landlord's
free exercise rights utilize a similar framework and agree upon the
persuasiveness of particular arguments. Perhaps the most impor-
tant question a court faces is whether the state's interest lies in
eradicating all forms of invidious discrimination"'5 or is more
153. See Parsell, supra note 130, at 755 & n.51 (stating that courts in at least
five states, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Washington, have
retained the compelling interest test under their respective state constitutions).
154. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Attorney General v.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994), ultimately vacated and remanded the case,
finding no basis on the summary judgment record before it to determine whether
the state could or could not meet its burden of establishing a compelling interest
that would outweigh the substantial burden placed on the landlords' free exercise
rights. Id. at 241. The tenor of the court's language, however, despite protesta-
tions to the contrary, suggests that it doubted whether the state could meet its
burden.
155. Since only the Alaska Supreme Court has found the state able to satisfy
the compelling interest test, it is not surprising that none of the four other courts
have found a compelling interest in eradicating all forms of invidious discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
32, 44 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting view that a compelling general interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination would suffice), review granted and opinion
superseded by 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993);
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 238 (rejecting as insufficient the notion that a general
objective of eliminating all forms of discrimination specified in statute alone
provided a compelling state interest, instead declaring, "At the least, the Common-
wealth must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in the elimination of
discrimination in housing against an unmarried man and an unmarried woman who
have a sexual relationship and wish to rent accommodations to which [the anti-
discrimination statute] applies."). But see State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d
2, 15 (Minn. 1990) (arguing that eradicating invidious discrimination of all kinds
is a compelling state interest, and, since housing is a "basic human need regardless
of a person's personal characteristics," it was proper for the legislature to prohibit
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narrowly drawn toward preventing specific discrimination aimed at
unmarried cohabitants."5 6 If a court answers with the latter, then
it is highly doubtful that the state will be able to demonstrate a
compelling interest to the court's satisfaction. In finding that latter
answer, courts often rely upon the differentiation between the legal
entitlements of married and unmarried couples'57 and attempt to
gauge the extent to which the state professes a public policy
favoring marriage,' perhaps in the form of a fornication stat-
ute.59 If the state itself discriminates against unmarried couples
discrimination in housing on the basis of marital status) (Popovich, CJ.,
dissenting); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49 (interpreting the state's interest as
encompassing the eradication of discrimination in all forms and focusing not on
whether there is a compelling interest in preventing marital discrimination in
housing but rather on the interest in providing discrimination-free access to
housing) (Grignon, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., French, 460 N.W.2d at 10 (plurality) (construing state's interest
in protecting cohabiting couples quite narrowly since marriage was the "preferred
status").
157. See, e.g., id. (noting legal differentiation with respect to employee life and
health insurance benefits, laws of intestate succession, marital communication
privilege); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (noting the disfavored legal status of
unmarried couples with respect to loss of consortium, unemployment compensa-
tion, overnight prison visits, wrongful death actions, marital communication
privilege); Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395,
404-05 (Ct. App.) (noting the lack of legal equivalence with regard to actions for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium, prison conjugal
visit rights, joint umbrella insurance underwriting, state employee dental benefits,
action for wrongful death, marital communication privilege), review granted and
opinion superseded by 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 239-40 &
nn. 10-11 (noting statutes and judicial decisions conferring unequal legal rights with
regard to, inter alia, worker's compensation law, continuing health insurance
coverage for divorced or separated spouses, extent of family coverage under motor
vehicle insurance policy, definition of family for life insurance policies, intestate
succession laws, wrongful death action, marital communication privilege, right to
sue for loss of consortium, right to separate support and alimony).
158. See, e.g., Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45 (declaring that the state maintains
a "strong public policy favoring marriage," with no similar policy advocating the
"maintenance of nonmarital relationships" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
159. See, e.g., French, 460 N.W.2d at 10 (questioning how there could be a
"compelling state interest in promoting fornication when there is a state statute on
the books prohibiting it?" (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (1988))); Desilets, 636
N.E.2d at 240 (questioning the constitutionality of the state's fornication statute,
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 18 (1992), at least as regards private, consensual conduct
of individuals over the age of consent, but admitting its existence tended to
diminish the strength of the state's interest to some extent). But cf. id. at 245 n.7
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in certain circumstances, it is suggested that protection of unmar-
ried couples must fall lower in the hierarchy of state policies than
protection of other classifications or even other forms of marital
status.160 Moreover, the level of scrutiny appropriate to the
classification is also considered probative.161
In determining the substantiality of the burden placed on the
landlord's religious beliefs, courts consider, or at least acknowledge,
the commercial context. 6 The landlord's voluntary choice to
enter the marketplace is contrasted with the cost of either adhering
to or modifying one's religious beliefs."6 This cost may be
expressed in terms of stigma or the penalties that may be imposed
for violation of the anti-discrimination laws."6
(rejecting claim of unconstitutionality of fornication statute) (Liacos, C.J.,
concurring).
160. See, e.g., Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (requiring that state's interest be
placed in hierarchy of state policies and finding that prohibiting marital status
discrimination against unmarried couples did not rank very high); Smith, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 405 (finding that legislative history suggested a hierarchy of classifica-
tions within "marital status," with unmarried couples at the bottom to comport
with state's strong interest in favoring marriage); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 239
(finding marital status to be of lower order than other, constitutionally based
classifications and noting that sex, race, color, creed and national origin, but not
marital status, are classifications for which discrimination is constitutionally pro-
scribed).
161. See, e.g., Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404 (finding state lacked compelling
interest in protecting unmarried couples in housing in part because, unlike racial
classifications, which demand strict scrutiny, no similarly heightened level of
scrutiny is required for marital status classifications).
162. In fact, the commercial context has proved more important for those who
would find no religious exemption is due. See, e.g., French, 460 N.W.2d at 14-15
(arguing that, despite the sincerity of the landlord's religious beliefs, the burden
falling on those beliefs was greatly lessened since it was a voluntary choice to enter
the public marketplace where one may encounter laws contrary to one's beliefs
(citations omitted)) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49
(arguing that the burden imposed on religious conduct was slight since the
landlords "engaged in secular commercial conduct performed for profit," for which
there were "no religious motivations," and which could scarcely be characterized
as the "aiding or abetting of sin") (Grignon, J., dissenting).
163. See, e.g., Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 (finding a real burden on the
exercise of religious beliefs and arguing that one's freedom of religion is not lost
just by engaging in "worldly activities" and that the burden is not merely
incidental, being in the instant case personal, spiritual and financial).
164. See, e.g., Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 237-38 (recognizing that religious beliefs
may be substantially burdened because of the stigma of nonconformity and the
significant sanctions that may be imposed for violation of the state's marital status
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Finally, courts sometimes look to the practical effect of
granting a religious exemption. In particular, they question
whether a housing shortage for unmarried cohabitants will result if
such landlords are permitted to discriminate against unmarried
couples.'65
In the end, the framework of the balancing test in free exercise
challenges seems supportable by two forms of analytical scaffolding,
one that tips toward finding a compelling state interest and one
that does not. The final substance of marital status discrimination
prohibitions in housing seems ultimately to be determined by the
form of scaffolding erected around the framework. Which
scaffolding is selected appears to have less to do with jurispruden-
tial tradition than with moral choice.
2. "Peace and safety" clauses. Not surprisingly, in the wake
of Smith, state courts have sought to base greater protections for
religious liberty in state constitutional provisions."m In interpret-
ing free exercise provisions, state courts have available to them not
only the tools of decisional analysis but also those of textual
analysis, for state free exercise provisions are often strikingly
different from the federal provision. One major difference is the
presence of "peace and safety" clauses in state constitutions that at
least facially appear to limit religious liberty by providing that free
exercise of religion may not impinge on the public peace and
safety.67 It has been argued, however, that peace and safety
clauses are purposeless if they do not instead exempt believers from
otherwise valid laws."s  In other words, such clauses at least
"impliedly confirm that generally applicable laws cannot prevent or
prohibit religious activities that do not threaten the public 'peace
anti-discrimination provision).
165. See, e.g., Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 (arguing that the "instant case does
not raise the spectre of floodgates opened to a myriad of exemptions from the
state anti-discrimination law" since the record contained no evidence of a host of
similarly situated landlords ready to demand exemptions and create a housing
shortage for unmarried couples); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 240 (noting the absence
from the record of evidence of the effect on the rental housing market for
unmarried couples entailed by granting exemptions to like-minded landlords).
166. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
167. See Miller & Sheers, supra note 152, at 322 (compiling common clauses in
state free exercise provisions).
168. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109, 1118 (1990).
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and safety.""' 69  Thus peace and safety clauses can be read
expansively, protecting religious liberty at least beyond the Smith
decision and possibly further, or much more narrowly, as a true
limitation on the free exercise right itself.
California, Massachusetts and Minnesota have peace and safety
clauses in their respective free exercise provisions.70 While the
court in Donahue based its decision entirely on the California
Constitution, it did not analyze those textual differences between
the state and federal provisions. But the three other courts, Smith,
Desilets and French, at least noted that the scope of protection for
religious liberty might depend in part on such textual differences.
In French, for example, the plurality read Minnesota's peace
and safety clause to provide far more protection for religious
liberty than the federal constitution. The plurality would place a
stringent burden on the state, permitting interference with the
"rights of conscience" only where the state can show that the
religious practice in question is "licentious" or "inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the state."'' The California court in Smith
also noted the broader language of its state constitution, especially
its affirmative guarantee of free exercise, so long as the religious
action does not infringe the peace and safety clause.'" Yet while
reading this guarantee as "placing a heavier burden on the state to
justify its infringement" than under the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, it applied the traditional
compelling interest analysis.'73 Finally, a majority of the court in
Desilets noted that article 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
169. Parsell, supra note 130, at 766.
170. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 2; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
171. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990). This view was
essentially adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court a few months later in State
v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). The Hershberger court concluded
that not only does the state constitution generally prevent government interference
with religious freedom, but it also explicitly grants affirmative free exercise rights.
In fact, the court held, the only state interests compelling enough to justify
interference with free exercise are those that prevent licentiousness or preserve the
public peace or safety. Id. at 397; see also Parsell, supra note 130, at 768-69
(analyzing the interpretation of Minnesota's peace and safety clause).
172. See Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comn'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395,
409 (Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded by 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
173. Id. at 408-10. The court also noted the similar interpretations in the
Minnesota decisions in Hershberger and French.
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Rights provides absolute protection, with no balancing of interests,
for religious conduct so long as it neither "disturb[s] the public
peace, [n]or obstruct[s] others in their religious worship."'74 The
plurality, however, went on to find that the scope of conduct that
is absolutely protected has yet to be defined by case law and, in
any event, that the violation of the state anti-discrimination statute
disturbed the public peace, thus requiring the traditional balancing
test.175
These cases, then, illustrate the ways in which peace and safety
clauses may be used as additional constitutional components in the
analysis of state free exercise protections.16  While the courts'
views are not definitive, they suggest that courts interpreting such
provisions are likely to provide no less protection than would be
accorded religious liberty under the compelling interest test and
perhaps much more-indeed, absolute protection-subject only to
the exclusive limitation of the clause itself These cases demon-
strate no tendency to provide only an intermediate level of
protection somewhere between that of Smith and the compelling
interest test of Sherbert or RFRA.
B. Alaska Jurisprudence
In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission," the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Constitution provides
greater protection for religious liberty than the federal constitution
provides under Smith, even though the free exercise clauses of both
are virtually identical.' Instead, according to the court, Alaska
174. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E2d 233,242 (Mass. 1994) (plurality
opinion) (quoting MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 2) (internal quotation
marks omitted); id. at 243 (Liacos, C.J., concurring).
175. Id. at 242-43.
176. For analysis of some other recent interpretations of peace and safety
clauses, see Parsell, supra note 130, at 765-69.
177. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
178. Id. at 280-81. The Alaska Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4. The Alaska Supreme Court's
approach thus demonstrates that substantive differences do not inhere in words
alone, but also in constitutional jurisprudence. It should be noted that in each of
the other jurisdictions in which courts have addressed free exercise challenges to
marital status anti-discrimination housing provisions, even the language in those
state constitutions differed from the federal free exercise provision, let alone the
jurisprudence. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; MASS. DECLARATION OF RGHTS art.
2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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free exercise jurisprudence requires the compelling interest test as
adopted and developed by Frank v. State'79 and its progeny.',
In Frank, the court reversed the conviction of an Athabascan
Indian who had taken a cow moose out of season for a funeral
potlatch. The court concluded that, under both the federal and
state constitutions, Frank's conduct was protected because the state
had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest.' The court
hewed closely to the standards set forth in Sherbert and Yoder,
especially in its analysis determining whether an exemption is
required to a facially neutral law."
It found that to invoke a religious exemption, three prelimi-
nary requirements must first be met: (1) a religion must be
involved; (2) the conduct in question must be religiously based; and
(3) the claimant must be sincere in her religious beliefs." The
Frank court found only the second requirement to present a
question. Yet while fresh moose meat was not essential for a
funeral potlatch, the court determined that test to be too strict.
Instead, "[i]t is sufficient that the practice be deeply rooted in
religious belief to bring it within the ambit of the free exercise
clause ....,,84
In turning to evaluate the competing state interest, the Frank
court accepted that the state unquestionably possesses a very strong
interest in its hunting restrictions. But, the court reasoned, the
question is not whether there is a compelling state interest in
maintaining a healthy moose population, rather it is whether that
interest suffers if the religious practice is accommodated by an
179. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
180. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281.
181. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1069-70, 1074.
182. Id. at 1070 (stating that "religiously impelled actions can be forbidden only
where they pose 'some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,' or
where there are competing governmental interests that are 'of the highest order
and ... [are] not otherwise served ... ."' (quoting, respectively, Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))).
183. Id. at 1071 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)).
184. Id. at 1072-73. But see id. at 1076 ("Unless the use of fresh moose meat
rises to the level of a cardinal religious principle, unless it is central to a religious
observance, it cannot qualify as a practice protected by the 'free exercise' clauses
of either the state or federal constitutions." (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 219 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)) (Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
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exemption."8 Since there was no showing that granting an
exemption to Athabascans for funeral potlatches would result in so
many moose being taken as to jeopardize population levels, the
state had failed to carry its burden.'86
Three years later, when the Alaska Supreme Court again faced
a free exercise claim for an exemption from a facially neutral law,
it clarified and solidified the doctrines it had announced in Frank.
In Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward,'" the court held that a
city did not have to allow a church to operate a parochial school in
its own building where there was a zoning ordinance that prohibit-
ed all nonpublic schools from certain residential areas.'88 The
court summarized the Frank ruling on exemptions as preventing the
government from forcing religious practitioners to face the
Hobson's choice of "complying with the law or abandoning the
precepts of their religion."'89  In Seward Chapel, the zoning
185. Id. at 1073.
186. Id. at 1074. The court also doubted the state's contention that "widespread
civil disobedience will result if Athabascans are allowed to take moose out of
season when necessary for a funeral potlatch." Id.
The Frank court's reasoning with regard to proving the harm to the state in
granting the exemption is very much akin to that of the California court in Smith
and the Massachusetts court in Desilets. Compare id. ("We are not advised as to
how many funeral potlatches are held each year, nor how many moose are legally
taken, nor the level of harvest that would cause a population decline. All the
record reveals is that there was but one funeral potlatch in Minto in 1975, and that
one moose was needed for it.") with Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous.
Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 407 (Ct. App.) (arguing that the "instant case does
not raise the spectre of floodgates opened to a myriad of exemptions from the
state anti-discrimination law" since the record contained no evidence of a host of
similarly situated landlords ready to demand exemptions and create a housing
shortage for unmarried couples), review granted and opinion superseded by 880
P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994) and Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,240 (Mass.
1994) (stating that one major factor missing from the record was any evidence of
the effect on the rental housing market for unmarried couples that accomodating
similarly situated landlords with an exemption would entail).
It is important to note that the court did suggest that the state could adopt
regulations governing the taking of moose that would aid in determining the
impact of the exemption on moose populations. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1075. The
implication is that upon a proper showing the state may satisfy its burden of
demonstrating a compelling interest and thereby deny the exemption.
187. 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
188. Id. at 1294.
189. Id. at 1301. The court again noted that exemptions need not be granted
when there are competing government interests of the highest order or when
public safety, peace or order are substantially threatened. Id. at 1301 n.33
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ordinance did not force such a choice for two principal reasons.
First, there was no showing that the members of the church
possessed a religious belief requiring them to locate in that
particular area."l Second, the burden of which the church was
conplaining--characterized by the court as one of inconvenience
and economics-was primarily caused by the church's own
voluntary choice to build in a residential area in which it knew
parochial schools were not permitted-indeed as it well knew
before acquiring the site.'
Frank and Seward Chapel thus demonstrate together that the
court is serious in its requirement that each side establish that their
respective burdens have been carried. It appears that the state's
interest cannot be too diffuse, nor should the free exercise
claimant's burdens be of his own making.
C. A New Two-Fold Government Interest Test
In Swanner, the Alaska Supreme Court carefully applied, and
ultimately distinguished, the holdings of Frank and Seward Chapel
and denied a landlord a religious exemption from marital status
anti-discrimination provisions in housing. The court initially
determined whether Swanner satisfied the three requirements
necessary to invoke an exemption for free exercise. Although the
lower court had held that Swanner failed the second requirement
because his conduct was not religiously based, the Alaska Supreme
Court found otherwise." In liberally applying the Frank stan-
dard, the supreme court held that Swanner's refusal to rent to
unmarried couples had an arguable doctrinal basis and thus was
"sufficiently religiously based" to meet the state constitutional
test.'93
The burden then shifted to the state to establish one of the
two prongs of the Frank test: either that Swanner's conduct posed
a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order, or that its
(quoting Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979)).
190. Id. at 1302. Thus one of the three requirements necessary to invoke a
claim for a religious exemption was lacking.
191. Id.
192. Swarmer v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comnm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281-82
(Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
193. Id.
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competing interest was of the highest order.94 The court rested
its reasoning on the second prong alone.195 In perhaps the most
novel development of post-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, the
Swanner court created a new two-fold government interest test.
Without citing to any authority, the court identified two interests
the government possesses in cases like Swanner: "a 'derivative'
interest in ensuring access to housing for everyone, and a 'transac-
tional' interest in preventing individual acts of discrimination based
on irrelevant characteristics."'196 A derivative interest, the court
explained, is the state's concern, not with a particular activity, but
with an effect of that activityY By contrast, a transactional
interest manifests the state's objection to the particular activity
itself.198
The court noted that most free exercise claims implicate the
state's derivative interests, and it distinguished Frank on that basis.
In Frank, the state possessed no transactional interest because it
did not object to moose killing per se, only moose killing out of
season. In contrast, the state's derivative interest in maintaining
healthy moose populations was insufficient by itself to deny a
religious exemption. Similarly, the Swanner court argued, if an
unmarried couple were denied housing by a religiously impelled
landlord but later found alternative housing, the state's derivative
interest in providing access to housing for everyone would then be
satisfied. 199
Instead, the government's transactional interest in preventing
discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics, regardless of
whether the unmarried couple eventually finds alternative housing,
precludes granting a religious exemption to a landlord refusing to
rent to such couples. The state legislature and the Anchorage
Municipal Assembly, in enacting housing anti-discrimination
provisions, determined that acts of discrimination are "independent
social evils" that "degradefl individuals, affront[] human dignity,
194. Although the court never discusses the matter explicitly, it is assumed that
showing a state interest of the highest order is equivalent to establishing a
compelling state interest, a safe assumption since the language establishing this test
derives from Yoder. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
195. But see infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
196. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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and limit[] one's opportunities."" Under the Frank test, the
Swanner court concluded, the state's interest in preventing
discrimination per se will clearly "suffer if an exemption is granted
to accommodate the religious practice at issue."'"
Three observations are immediately notable. First, by finding
a transactional interest, the denial of the exemption is certain to
follow. This inevitability is occasioned by the epistemological status
of the transactional interest and by the bifurcated nature of the
Frank test itself. Since the transactional interest is defined in terms
of a per se objection to activity, it is tautological that the transac-
tional interest "will suffer if an exemption is granted to accommo-
date the religious practice." Moreover, the establishment of the
transactional interest is sufficient unto itself; it appears there need
be no showing of a compelling transactional interest. This is
because under the Frank test, as expanded and distinguished in
Swanner, the compelling interest analysis has already been satisfied
by the showing of a derivative interest. In other words, by
establishing a derivative interest, the state meets its initial burden
of showing a compelling state interest. The question then narrows
to whether that interest must nonetheless yield to a harmless
exception. If there also exists a transactional interest, the answer
is no.20
200. Id. at 282-83.
201. Id. at 283 (quoting Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Alaska 1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In illustrating whatit meant by transactional
interests, the court referred to Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In
Prince, an exemption from the child labor laws was denied for children to
distribute religious literature. The Swanner court saw this denial as based on a
transactional interest in preventing exploitation of all children in employment.
The state obviously objected to child labor per se and not to any particular effect
of that activity. Permitting any children to work would clearly harm the
government's transactional interest on this view. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
202. This is not to imply that if a transactional interest is not found to exist,
then the derivative interest is automatically insufficient and the exemption must
be granted. For example, as the court noted in Seward Chapel:
[O]ur ruling in Frank might well have been different had the state's game
regulations not prevented the appellant from providing moose meat for
a funeral potlatch but had reasonably limited the areas in which a moose
could be taken. Our ruling in Frank did not establish that the duty of
accommodation requires the state to wholly exempt from game
regulations persons claiming interference with their religious beliefs.
Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1302 n.34 (Alaska 1982).
It would thus appear that Frank and Seward Chapel, and perhaps now Swanner,
establish a "narrowly tailored" requirement, heretofore absent. In other words,
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The second observation to be noted concerns the Swanner
court's assertion that most free exercise claims in which exemptions
are granted involve only derivative interests; it is the existence of
a transactional interest that distinguishes Swanner and results in
denial. But it has already been seen above that most free
exercise challenges do not, in fact, result in exemptions, at least
outside the employment context.? It must be seriously ques-
tioned whether the Swanner court's creation of the two-fold
government interest test is really anything but a facile distinction
between those cases in which the exemption is granted and those
in which it is denied.
Finally, it must be noted that the finding of a transactional
interest inevitably entails line-drawing. This is troubling, for the
seductive attraction of the transactional interest concept is that,
within the scope of the state's per se objection to some iniquitous
activity, it is absolute. In Swanner, the court determined that the
state's transactional interest is preventing discrimination in housing
based on irrelevant characteristics. Yet, in fact, the state permits
certain of those very same characteristics to serve as the basis for
housing for "singles" or "married couples" only.' Perhaps this
difficulty is resolvable by arguing that any line-drawing is the
province of the legislature: the legislature affirmatively decided
that housing for "singles" or "married couples" only filled an
appropriate niche in the housing market. On the other hand, the
if the state regulation exhibits a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored
to its ends, a religious exemption need not be granted. Post Seward Chapel, the
state's interest expressed as a narrowly drawn regulation would suffer if an
exemption were granted. Query whether, post Swanner, a derivative interest
expressed as a regulation tailored narrowly enough is isomorphic with a transac-
tional interest.
It should be apparent from the discussion in this note and the accompanying
text that transactional interests are dependent on derivative interests in the sense
that derivative interests may exist without transactional interests in a given case
but transactional interests do not exist without corresponding derivative interests.
This appears to be paradoxical since derivative interests are concerned with the
effects of an activity whereas transactional interests are concerned with the activity
itself. The paradox is only partially explained by the chosen nomenclature.
203. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282-83.
204. See supra note 130.
205. Alaska Statutes section 18.80.240 expressly excepts from its anti-discrimina-
tion provisions "classes of real property commonly known as housing for 'singles'
or 'married couples' only." Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240(1), (2); see also supra note 99
for the full text of the provision.
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legislature appears negatively to have implied that "irrelevant
characteristics" do not embrace sexual orientation, although
certainly that characteristic is irrelevant to paying the rent and
being a good tenant.°  Because it is difficult to believe that
courts will not, must not, or should not ever engage in line-drawing
of their own, the question returns whether the line is drawn where
the exemption is granted or not granted.
In arriving at its ultimate decision that Swanner's free exercise
rights under the Alaska Constitution were not violated by the
denial of an exemption, the court carefully noted that any burden
placed on Swanner's religious conduct really results from his
commercial activities.' Applying the analysis developed in
Seward Chapel, the court found that Swanner made "no showing of
a religious belief which requires that he engage in the property-
rental business."'  In addition, the court rejected Swanner's
claim that he was put to a Hobson's choice, for he voluntarily chose
to engage in property management, a commercial activity regulated
by anti-discrimination laws to which all who so engage are
subject.209
In some ways, these comments seem to be an afterthought. In
the traditional balancing process, it is proper to weigh the substanti-
ality of the burden placed on the claimant's free exercise with the
competing government interest. In the two-fold test created in
Swanner, this balancing is more appropriate for comparing the
burden on free exercise with the state's derivative interest. Yet the
court based its decision on a per se transactional interest, where
such weighing is superfluous. In fact, by weighing these interests,
the court was buttressing its opinion against the very perceptive
and penetrating analysis of Chief Justice Moore's solo dissent.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Moore criticized the court's
decision denying the religious exemption. While rebuking the court
206. For that matter, the legislature never expressly decided that marital status
included unmarried cohabitants.
207. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283. The court noted the distinction the U.S.
Supreme Court has drawn between commercial activity and religious observance:
"When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and
faith, are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on
others in that activity." Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261
(1982)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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for its new two-fold test, which he characterized as "unnecessary,"
"amorphous," and "useless,"21 Chief Justice Moore principally
argued that even under the new test, the state failed to sustain its
burden of establishing a state interest of the highest order. His
reasoning, although not derivative, relied on an analytical frame-
work similar to that of other courts that have addressed the issue
of granting a religious exemption in the context of marital status
discrimination in housing.
211
In particular, Chief Justice Moore argued that marital status
classifications are relatively low in the hierarchy of protected
interests and hence do not warrant heightened governmental
protection. Like other states, Alaska statutory law itself discrimi-
nates on the basis of marital status in the realms of intestate
succession, workers' compensation death benefits and the marital
communication privilege.212 Moreover, as the chief justice point-
ed out, there has never been any heightened scrutiny under either
federal or Alaska equal protection analysis for marital status
classifications, as there is for race-based and gender-based discrimi-
nation.2" Chief Justice Moore went on to note that federal laws
do not treat marital status discrimination as a compelling state
210. Id. at 287 (Moore, CJ., dissenting).
211. In fact, Chief Justice Moore makes no reference to the other cases dealing
with similar facts. In the cases of Smith and Desilets, this is obviously because
these cases came down after Swanner. As for French and Donahue, Chief Justice
Moore may well have agreed with the court's assessment that "[n]either case
provides... meaningful guidance in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause of the
Alaska Constitution." Id. at 281 n.10. The court distinguished French on three
grounds: (1) the French court's conclusion that the marital status provision of the
anti-discrimination law did not include unmarried couples whereas Alaska's did,
as determined in Foreman, see supra notes 76 and 112 and accompanying text; (2)
the continuing existence of a fornication statute in Minnesota; and (3) the very
different language of the respective state constitutions. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281
n.10. The court dismissed Donahue, not only because it was based on independent
state constitutional grounds, but primarily because the California Supreme Court
had depublished the opinion, "rendering the decision uncitable." Id.
212. Id. at 288-89 (citing Alaska Stat. § 13.11.015 (1985) (intestate succession);
id. § 23.30.215(a) (1990) (workers' compensation death benefits); Alaska R. Evid.
505 (marital communication privilege)) (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
213. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 289 (citations omitted) (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
Accord Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235,239 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Because [a] classification
based on marital status does not involve a suspect class .... we must examine it
under the rational basis test."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1309 (1994).
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interest.214  Such discrimination cannot be elevated to the same
plane of invidiousness as that directed against certain historically
disadvantaged groups."1 The conclusion to these four arguments
followed inexorably for Chief Justice Moore, as apparently it must
for anyone unwilling to find discrimination per se invidious:
My research has not revealed a single instance in which the
government's interest in eliminating marital status discrimination
has been accorded substantial weight when balanced against
other state interests, let alone fundamental constitutional rights.
I find nothing to suggest that marital status discrimination is so
invidious as to outweigh the fundamental right to free exercise
of religion.216
In weighing the substantiality of the burden on the other side
of the equation, the chief justice found the majority's depreciation
of Swanner's free exercise burdens in the commercial context
unavailing. Swanner had been put to a Hobson's choice, he
concluded, and the commercial setting no more lowered the need
for the state to establish an overriding interest than it resulted in
a waiver of one's constitutional right to free exercise.2"
Finally, the chief justice's main criticism of and insight into the
new two-fold government interest test is that the identification of
a transactional interest is conclusory. If a transactional interest
exists, then there need be no evidentiary showing that rental
housing for unmarried couples is scarce.21' But Frank had
established, Chief Justice Moore argued, that mere speculation,
without supporting data, is insufficient to establish a compelling
interest. The instant case was directly analogous to Frank, in which
there was no evidence that taking moose for funeral potlatches
would jeopardize population levels; here there was no evidence of
214. Id. at 289 (citing, inter alia, the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1988); the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1988); James A.
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of
Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1106 (1989)) (Moore, Ci., dissenting); see
also supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
215. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 287-88 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 593-95 (1983) (racial discrimination); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (gender discrimination)) (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 289 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 289-90, 291 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 286 (Moore, CJ., dissenting). Moreover, the chief justice character-
ized the majority's new test as a "game where the 'transactional' or 'derivative'
label attached to any given state interest predetermines the outcome of the case."
Id. at 287 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
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an abundance of landlords like Swanner posing a substantial threat
to housing availability or community welfare.219
In fact, it seems that, for Chief Justice Moore, this lack of an
evidentiary basis played a dual role. Not only was the labelling of
an interest as transactional conclusory, but the conduct at issue
could not be shown to pose a substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order either. Thus the state also failed the second prong
of the Frank test, the burden on the free exercise rights could not
be justified, and a religious exemption was due.
This apparent reading by Chief Justice Moore of the "public
safety, peace or order" prong is weaker than initially may be
thought. Although the majority ignored this justification for
denying an exemption,' there are strong reasons to argue that
Swanner was correctly decided on these independent grounds
without the need to create the new two-fold test.
Unlike the state free exercise clauses of California, Massachu-
setts and Minnesota, the Alaska Constitution's Free Exercise
Clause, being essentially identical to the federal provision, does not
contain a peace and safety clause.2  However, Alaska free
exercise jurisprudence as developed in Frank and Seward Chapel
has imputed such a limitation to free exercise liberty. That is,
religious conduct can be prohibited either where it poses "some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order" or where the
competing state interest is "of the highest order."' It is argu-
able, as the plurality in the Massachusetts case of Desilets
found,' that a landlord's conduct in discriminating against
unmarried couples in violation of the anti-discrimination laws
disturbs the public peace or order. This interpretation of Alaska
jurisprudence thus provides an independent basis to deny such
landlords a religious exemption. More significantly, however, and
unlike the marital status anti-discrimination provisions in the other
jurisdictions, the Alaska legislature has made an explicit finding
that discrimination on the basis of marital status, among others,
219. Id. at 290-91 (Moore, CJ., dissenting).
220. See id. at 290 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
221. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 170 and 178 and accompanying text.
223. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293,
1301 n.33 (Alaska 1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
224. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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"threatens [the] peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of
the state and its inhabitants."'  When this finding, given a
statutory basis by the legislature, is coupled with the argument that
violation of state laws disturbs the public peace or order, the
second prong of Frank is clearly satisfied.' On this reading, the
Swanner court's creation of a derivative and transactional interests
test becomes unnecessary-and its problematic nature avoid-
able-because the denial of an exemption does not violate
Swanner's free exercise rights under the Alaska Constitution.
The Swanner court did not, however, base its decision on such
a reading; instead it created this new two-fold test. The question
thus remains what the real meaning and import of this new test is
for Alaska free exercise jurisprudence. Will it, as Chief Justice
Moore prophesied, "prove to be useless in resolving future free
exercise cases" and "return to haunt this court in future deci-
sions"?' Or does it instead present a novel approach to the
inevitable balancing of interests that state courts will be forced to
undertake until the constitutionality of RFRA is settled, and
perhaps even afterwards-especially in the context of weighing the
state's interest(s) in protecting the civil rights of some citizens with
burdening the religious liberty of others?
Although Alaska free exercise jurisprudence is not extensively
developed, Frank and Seward Chapel are natural candidates to
225. Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200(a) (1991). For the complete text of the provision,
see supra note 101. The Anchorage Municipal Assembly made a similar, although
not as strongly worded, finding that marital status discrimination in housing,
among others, "adversely affects the welfare of the community." Anchorage Mun.
Code § 05.10.010. For the complete text of this provision, see supra note 101.
226. Were the Alaska Supreme Court to have decided Swanner on the basis of
this public safety, peace or order prong under Frank, the result would still have
been anomalous. Each of the courts in California, Massachusetts and Minnesota
that considered a similar requirement found that the peace and safety clause
provided greater protection for religious liberty than even the compelling interest
test would without the peace and safety clause, i.e., it acted as a floor of
protection. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. In the case of Alaska, the
peace or order prong instead appears to act as a ceiling, providing no greater
protection for religious liberty than the compelling interest prong. In fact, because
of RFRA, assuming its constitutionality, and the state constitutional demands of
Frank and Seward Chapel, the peace or order prong must act as a substitute or
alternative to the compelling interest prong, providing equivalent protection for
religious liberty regardless of the prong of the Frank test the state attempts to
satisfy.
227. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 286, 291 (Moore, CJ., dissenting).
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consider the potential effect of the two-fold test, for their analyses
provide starting points for determining whether the new test would
change their results. The Swanner court already indicated, in fact,
that the result in Frank is explicable through application of the new
test.' In Frank, the state possessed no transactional interest in
preventing moose killing per se, since it permitted moose hunting
in season. Although the state did possess a derivative interest in
maintaining adequate moose populations, that interest was
inadequate on the evidentiary record to sustain the denial of an
exemption.229
The Swanner court's treatment does not take one very far. It
does seem to suggest, however, that, were the state to prohibit
outright all moose taking (perhaps because it deemed moose
endangered or otherwise ecologically indispensable), it might
possess a transactional interest, and therefore it could justifiably
deny an exemption for Athabascan funeral potlatches. In order to
avoid making the "label attached to any given state interest
predetermine[] the outcome of the case,"' as Chief Justice
Moore critically questioned, can a derivative interest be identified
that is compelling enough to justify a denial, yet not amount to a
transactional interest in all but semantics?
To take an example offered by the Seward Chapel court to
clarify Frank, suppose Alaska's game regulations permitted the
taking of moose, and so did not prevent Athabascans from
providing moose meat for funeral potlatches in principle, but
instead reasonably limited the areas in which moose could be
taken."1 Clearly the state possesses no more of a transactional
interest in this example than in the original case, for the state does
228. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
229. The Frank court itself suggested that an evidentiary record could be
developed by "[c]arefully designed regulations... which would be of value in
determining the impact of the exemption on moose populations." Frank v. State,
604 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Alaska 1979); see also id. (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 668a
(authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to permit eagles to be taken for religious
purposes of Native Americans upon a finding of compatibility with preservation
of the species); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 29.106 (1989) (permitting the taking of deer by
Winnebagos for religious ceremonies under the aegis of appropriate administrative
regulations)).
230. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 287 (Moore, C.J, dissenting).
231. See Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1302 n.34
(Alaska 1982). The court suggested that the exemption may possibly have been
denied in such circumstances.
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not object to taking moose per se. Is the derivative interest
compelling? To the extent that such a place restriction is more
accommodating to the Athabascans' religious needs than a time
restriction (since death, and hence the necessity for a funeral
potlatch, may arise at any time), the state's means are certainly
more narrowly tailored. What, then, if an Athabascan violates the
regulation by killing a moose in an improper area? An evidentiary
basis for the denial of an exemption, that is, successful prosecution,
still appears to be lacking, although a reasonably drawn regulation
may presumptively have a lesser obstacle to overcome. Need the
state still establish that the permitted hunting area was reasonably
proximate to the village where the potlatch took place? Or that
moose were actually present and available to be taken in that area
at that time? If the state can satisfy these burdens, it would appear
that its derivative interest in maintaining moose populations is
compelling. Yet this result goes no further than that in Frank
itself. Had the state there demonstrated that its interest would
suffer if an exemption were granted, the state's burden would also
have been met.' 2
Since the Swanner court did not purport to overrule Frank,
certainly it is reassuring that the result is consistent under both the
old and new analyses. But it is far from compelling. Although one
is satisfied that there can exist compelling derivative interests so
that the new two-fold test does not collapse upon itself,' 3 the
differentiation in evidentiary requirements for transactional and
derivative interests remains problematic.
The Swanner court did not similarly distinguish Seward Chapel
under its new test because there the requisite showing of a religious
belief was lacking and the substantiality of the burden on the free
exercise claimants was greatly reduced; thus the state was never put
to its burden.' The Seward Chapel court did suggest, however,
that had the church acquired the site when zoning permitted a
parochial school on the premises, and then the zoning ordinance
was changed to forbid it, such a later restriction might be unaccept-
232. See Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1073-74 (Alaska 1979). The state could
have demonstrated this by providing evidentiary support in the nature of the
number of funeral potlatches, the number of moose legally taken and the level of
harvest that would result in a population decline.
233. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
234. See Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1302 (Alaska
1982); see also supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:2
FREE EXERCISE, FAIR HOUSING
able."5  It is clear that in either case the government would
possess no transactional interest, for the government does not
forbid the operation of all schools per se, or the operation of all
parochial schools per se, or even the operation of all schools in
certain residential areas. Instead, the government possesses a
clearly identifiable derivative interest in providing a quiet and
distraction-free residential area. Is this derivative interest compel-
ling? The court held that as long as the zoning scheme provided
some areas for parochial schools, the Frank requirements would be
satisfied, 6 and so the answer must be yes. Must an exemption
be granted if the zoning ordinance is changed per the hypothetical?
If the government established an evidentiary record showing the
difficulties and nuisances caused by permitting parochial schools in
other residential areas and that the only solution was to require all
new parochial schools to locate in either commercial or mixed-use
zones, then it would appear the government has satisfied its burden
and need not grant an exemption. A Seward Chapel-type case,
then, is analytically on par with a Frank-type case, and both are
inherently distinguishable from Swanner where the state possesses
a transactional interest. Yet the problem of the evidentiary
differentiation remains.
While there are adequate, independent grounds to support the
decision in Swanner, 7 the ultimate viability of the court's new
derivative and transactional interests test, where the former
requires evidentiary support but the latter does not, is far from
clear. Certainly it appears prima facie reasonable that any time the
state has a per se interest in preventing some harm, the state would
be harmed were it to permit exceptions. However, in the federal
context, especially in measuring the statutory right created by
RFRA (whose constitutionality must be assumed for the time
being), it must seriously be questioned whether the compelling
interest test of the new Alaska jurisprudence is isomorphic with the
compelling interest test of pre-Smith federal jurisprudence. At least
where the classification is not suspect (and marital status is not a
suspect classification), dispensing with the need for an evidentiary
basis is itself suspect."8
235. Seward Chapel, 655 P.2d at 1302 n.35.
236. Id. at 1302.
237. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,719 (1981) (rejecting state's
asserted reasons for denying an exemption due to lack of evidence in the record).
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From the perspective of litigants, the new test is weak because
it increases complexity and subverts certainty. Even though the
burden is on the state to establish a competing interest of the
highest order, the parties must be prepared to argue their positions
with regard to both derivative and transactional interests, which
may be difficult to identify. Moreover, the playing field appears
uneven. The government possesses the higher ground, for if it can
establish a transactional interest, it need not substantiate it with
evidentiary support. Still, the government should also lay a proper
evidentiary basis to support the finding of a compelling derivative
interest. While not properly his burden, it will be necessary for the
free exercise claimant to circumscribe carefully the nature of his
religious conduct in order to circumvent a finding of a transactional
interest, which would be fatal. It would also be foolhardy not to
demonstrate as many lacunae in the evidentiary record as possible.
Ultimately, the new test, by potentially lessening the burden on
the state, shifts power to the state and thereby weakens religious
liberty. This will be a welcome development to those who believe
the public weal is harmed by what is not the practice of religious
liberty at all but is, instead, brazen and invidious conduct justified
by the sacrosanct veil of religion. On their score, it will be more
difficult for religiously based bigotry to trump the civil rights of
others in housing, employment, education, etc. On the other hand,
the fundamental right of free exercise suffers irremediably
whenever sincerely held religious beliefs are made to submit to the
will of the state. It is a small step, and one made smaller by
increasing state power, from the prosecution of religiously impelled
actions to the persecution of religious beliefs. Thus the new two-
fold test may well be a two-edged sword.
VI. CONCLUSION
After Swanner, it is now clear that, in Alaska, landlords and
others engaged in the real property business cannot discriminate
against unmarried couples in providing opportunities for housing.
This is so even though the unmarried couple intends to cohabit in
a sexual relationship. Landlords and others who engage in such
discrimination can be prosecuted. They will not be granted an
exemption from complying with the law even if they sincerely
believe that cohabitation and fornication are sinful, or that they
themselves will be sinning due to their forced complicity. Alaska
thus provides substantially greater protection for unmarried couples
than other states, including California, Massachusetts and Minneso-
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ta, commonly thought to be among the most liberal with regard to
social and civil rights matters. Conversely, in Alaska, one's
religious freedom is constrained to a greater extent than in other
states once one enters the marketplace or otherwise becomes
entangled with the state's business.
Because, under the Alaska Constitution, the state's interest in
preventing individual acts of discrimination based on irrelevant
characteristics is transactional in nature, the civil rights protections
explicated in Swanner are arguably extendable to other classifica-
tions and to other realms of activity, such as employment and
education. 9  Perhaps most significantly-and surprisingly-it
appears that the marital status anti-discrimination provisions in
housing should also encompass same-sex couples. Since both sex
and marital status are irrelevant-and protected-characteristics,
the state's transactional interest in preventing discrimination on
such bases should similarly work to deny an exemption to landlords
and others who object to same-sex cohabitation on religious
grounds. Alaska may thus provide greater protection than other
states not only for unmarried heterosexual couples but also for
same-sex couples, a result that follows logically, if unintentionally,
from the Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning.
Doubtless some landlords will continue to discriminate.
Unmarried couples filing complaints with enforcement agencies
such as the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission will almost
unquestionably prevail. At least one important consequence for
practitioners representing clients who wish to pursue a potential
free exercise challenge will be the likely necessity to litigate in the
federal court system. The most promising avenue of attack in
seeking an exemption will be to argue that the federal statutory
right created by RFRA is not isomorphic with the compelling
interest test elaborated by state constitutional jurisprudence.
The Alaska frontier is not just an untrodden and physical
expansiveness. The Alaska frontier is also an expansiveness of
mind, of individualism and personal liberties. When the expansive
tendencies of those liberties inevitably conflict, the collective is
forced to choose and to define for itself the type of society it wishes
to build and establish. The Alaska Supreme Court, in interpreting
239. For an example of the beginning of this expansion, see Tumeo v.
University of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43 (Alaska Super. Ct., 4th Judicial Dist. filed
Jan. 11, 1995) and supra note 122.
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the will of the collective, has chosen to expand the civil liberties of
unmarried couples into realms untrodden by other states at the
expense of the down-trodden religious scruples of landlords. With
this act of self-definition, of self-recognition, it should be clear that
a sudden housing boom in new cohabitation will not be encour-
aged. Should more unmarried couples seek housing together it wil
be because the specter of discrimination has been exterminated, not
because the state is fostering "shacking up."2' Neither will same-
sex couples, interpreting Swanner or this Note, suddenly flock to
Alaska, finding here a civil rights Eden. Alaska's bold step will,
however, be subject to scrutiny, as all models must be. The
question posed is whether the Alaska model will be emulated or
reviled.
David Kushner
240. Cf. Kilpatrick, supra note 15, at B7 (headline derogatorily referring to the
right to "shack up").
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